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1 Overview 
 
At the center of Powers’ China and England (2019) is an extraordinary forgotten episode in the 
history of political ideas. There was a time when English radicals critiqued the corruption and 
injustice of the English political system by contrasting it with the superior example of China. There 
was a time when they advocated adopting a Chinese conceptual framework for thinking about 
politics. So dominant and prevalent was the English radicals’ use of this framework that their 
opponents took to dismissing their points as “the argument from the Chinese” (168, 190). 
 The core historical evidence of this episode is a remarkable set of texts from or about China 
published in English from the late seventeenth century up to the mid-eighteenth century, and 
subsequent commentaries and adoptions of those texts. Most striking amongst the Chinese texts are 
accounts of Song dynasty politics and administration. Specifically, the Chinese example was used to 
bring certain key ideas to England as a model of politics for the English to emulate: 
 
• meritocracy, rather than rank and authority as hereditary or at the pleasure of the 
sovereign; 
• equality under the law, rather than legal procedures differentiated by group membership; 
• separation of public and private (both a conception of office and a conception of public 
good); and 
• an ideal of political rule guided by concern for the common people. 
 
																																																						
∗		 Sandra Field, Jeffrey Flynn, Stephen Macedo, Longxi Zhang, and Martin Powers discussed Powers’ 
book China and England: The Preindustrial Struggle for Social Justice in Word and Image (Oxon and New 
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Philosophers and Philosophies” and organized by Brian Bruya (Eastern Michigan University, USA). 	
1  This research was supported by a Yale-NUS College Small Research Grant, Popular Power in the History 
of Political Thought (IG17-SR101). 
	
Journa l  o f  Wor ld  Phi lo sophie s   Author Meets Readers/189	
	
_______________	
Journal	of	World	Philosophies	5	(Summer	2020):	188-240	
Copyright	©	2020	Sandra	Field,	Jeffrey	Flynn,	Stephen	Macedo,	Martin	Powers,	and	Longxi	Zhang.	
e-ISSN:	2474-1795	•	http://scholarworks.iu.edu/iupjournals/index.php/jwp	•	doi:	10.2979/jourworlphil.5.1.11	
 The significance of this episode has been downplayed (87), but Powers insists, rightly, in my 
view, that a proper reflection on this episode should result in a profound reconfiguration of our 
political understandings (5-6). Both scholars and educated general readers in anglophone countries 
tend to have an underdeveloped global consciousness, especially when it comes to political values 
and ideals. Powers claims that the ideals in the texts were genuinely held in China, and were 
genuinely influential in England. Drawing attention to the Chinese genealogy of various putatively 
“western” values undermines civilizational essentialism; in particular, it undermines the way in which 
civilizational essentialism grounds a certain western exceptionalism. 
 Powers’ book is no ordinary history of political thought, neither with respect to method nor 
content. Powers makes great use of his disciplinary background as an art historian; he tells his story 
not only through texts but also with visual evidence: 
 
• images of “medieval” politics, in both China and England, centered on majesty, 
symbolism, and supernatural authority; 
• images of post-medieval politics, in both China and England, centered on everyday 
experiences; 
• images to show the enthusiastic uptake of Chinese ideas in Europe; and 
• images of European progressive politics without reference to Chinese ideas. 
 
Most striking to me was the shift that he traces from good politics represented through images of 
majesty and supernatural authority to good politics represented through images of everyday 
happiness (28-45, 62-78). Powers’ insistence on a broader cultural contexualization of written texts 
adds a richness and force to the arguments that is uncommon in the more standard writings of the 
history of political thought. 
 As for content, the book offers new treasures that may surprise even scholars of the history 
of political thought who do have cross-cultural knowledge. A distinctive feature of the book is its 
focus on texts of governance and administration from the Song dynasty (55-60, 154-5). There is a 
common tendency in studies of Chinese moral and political philosophy to attend exclusively to 
classical philosophical texts (especially the Analects and the Mengzi),1 according to which good politics 
is simply an extension of individual and communal virtue. In these texts, there is little attention to 
questions of institutional design, and even a skepticism about its relevance. But this leaves Chinese 
philosophy open to accusations of political naivete. Powers’ treatment of the Song administrative 
texts shows how Chinese ideals of rulerly virtue were not naive. To the contrary, they could be—and 
at times were—concretely operationalized. 
 
 
2 Schematic Points of the Argument 
 
Without wishing to detract in any way from the achievements of the book, I do have several critical 
questions to pose to it. For this purpose, let me schematize three key theses of the book. First, we 
have a structural thesis. Powers claims that the determinants of political ideals and values are structural, 
in the sense that under the same social-political conditions, the same ideals and values will arise 
anywhere in the world. This is an anti-essentialist thesis for understanding values (different cultures 
do not have essential values associated with them). There are two sub-claims to the structural thesis: 
 
(a) Powers claims that the emergence of certain values—notably, aiming for a meritocratic 
politics rather than a “group-based” politics (Powers’ own term, referring to 
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aristocratically, racially, and/or religiously stratified politics)—presuppose certain levels 
of cognitive complexity, which in turn seems to rely on educational advancement (6-9, 
26-8, 38, 45). 
(b) At other times, the determination of values appears more directly 
political/institutional, without appeal to educational levels (51, 89, 124, 214, 219, 223-
4, 229). 
 
It is not initially clear whether the structural thesis is established on the basis of the evidence in the 
book, or if it is a rubric through which to interpret that evidence. Overall, I think it tends more to be 
a rubric of interpretation. (I’ll return to this point.) 
 Second, we have a historical thesis. Powers claims that the Chinese first came up with the 
various political ideals and values that subsequently were so appealing to the English. He repeatedly 
remarks that these values were “alien” to the English prior to encountering them in the Chinese 
texts (92, 94, 95, 102, 126, 129, 134). And third, we have a contemporary thesis. On the basis of the 
structural and the historical thesis, Powers rejects the claim that China lacks ideas of “social justice” 
and “human rights” (i, v, 229). 
 
 
3 Minor Critical Comments 
 
Starting with the historical thesis, and despite its frequent appearance throughout the book, I am not 
sure how strongly Powers is committed to it. To start, it is in some tension with the structural thesis: 
if indeed values arise in response to universal structural features of modern politics, wouldn’t it be 
surprising that all the values were found first in China? In fact, sometimes Powers directly rejects 
this historical thesis, recognizing that there were similar ideas in circulation amongst radicals in 
England prior to the translation of the Chinese texts (4-9, 50-51, 89, 124). However, the book gives 
only passing mention to these radical ideas (50, 128, 136), and on the whole the book reduces 
English political consciousness to the early modern absolutism of King James and Thomas Hobbes 
(32-7, 88). The book also makes implausible claims that the distinction between the benefit of the 
ruler/ruling class and the benefit of the whole of society was unknown in England (56). But this 
distinction is foundational for a very long tradition of European thought, from the classical 
Aristotelian distinction between good and corrupt regimes, to the early modern republicans and 
monarchomachs. 
 Perhaps my observations are grist to the mill of Powers’ broader project, because they 
suggest support for his structural thesis (political ideals arise around the world in response to certain 
structural features of politics). It seems that Powers could significantly weaken his commitment to 
the historical thesis without damage to his project. Indeed, when I posed this criticism to Powers 
directly, he confirmed that his primary commitment is to the structural thesis. While there were 
interesting moments of historical influence, Powers’ more important point is that the English were 
not somehow civilizationally unique in coming up with the modern political values that we now 
celebrate. 
 Turning now to part (a) of the structural thesis, I do wonder why is it so important to 
Powers to say that certain values and political understandings can only arise with certain levels of 
education and cognitive development. For first, even if it is true, it is not clear that it is particularly 
illuminating. Even if a given level of education is necessary for a commitment to Powers’ value of 
social justice, it is certainly not sufficient. Powers himself observes that extreme levels of cognitive 
sophistication in the sciences can readily be found within highly stratified societies (45). And even 
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when there is a correlation between educational levels and value commitments, it seems to me that 
both the education and the values are probably driven by deeper social processes (plausible possible 
contenders include:  the transition from peasant to urban life, the intermingling of social groups that 
results, the dissolution of traditional social divisions by capitalism, the greater penetration of the 
state into everyday life?). Second, I am not sure that the thesis is true, even on Powers’ own 
evidence. Powers shows that there was a commitment to human equality and non-group-based 
politics already in classical Chinese texts and in Han dynasty rule, well before the rise of education 
that he places in the Song dynasty in China and in early modern England (39, 51-2, 109-11). In sum, 
I find version (b) of the structural thesis more plausible than version (a), but I didn’t feel that the 
book really needed version (a) to achieve its primary aims. 
 
 
4 Major Critical Comment 
 
My major critical comment focuses on version (b) of the structural thesis. Powers claims that the 
same values or ideals arise inevitably in relation to structural features of political power in complex 
societies. Powers refers to this cluster of values as “social justice,” or sometimes as “human rights” 
(i, 1, 9, 214, 222). Powers’ master concept is not just a generic idea of justice, but something more 
specific. Its primary defining element is its opposition to “group-based politics” (27-8 & passim), but 
it also holds together other more specific positive values in an orderly way: equality, rights, 
meritocracy, public/private distinction (36, 55, 105, 139, 215-22). It matches a certain contemporary 
conception of American democratic liberalism (229). But this is not surprising, because in Powers’ 
view, all complex societies will converge upon this single transhistorical and transcultural standard of 
the good and the just (8-9). 
 Powers’ discussion of social justice relies on an underlying presumption: that there is a single 
master-concept of political justice, encompassing all other more specific values and uniting them 
together; and that all societies tend towards recognizing it. There is a single linear scale between 
irrational and rational politics, and history moves forward along this scale. The normative endpoint 
is known; historical inquiry searches for earlier stirrings of this ideal. It is through this presumption 
that an assortment of specific historical instances, legal procedures, and political incidents can be 
read as adding up to a single moral phenomenon. 
 But this presumption is quite contentious. It positions Powers firmly on one side of a heated 
debate about historical methodology (see for instance Israel 2010; Moyn 2010).2 On the one side, 
where Powers stands, we have Whig historians, church historians, who have confidence in both 
their knowledge of the moral goal and the movement of history towards it (for instance, Jonathan 
Israel 2001).3 On the other side, we have historians of a more Nietzschean sensibility (for instance, 
Samuel Moyn 2012).4 This second type of historian asks: what if there is no unambiguous and 
unique final universal value? What if the values in fact governing different societies are different; or 
even if some of the values are more or less the same, what if they combine in different ways? And 
what if history moves non-linearly, such that stirrings of certain values in the past only led 
contingently to the present, and could have (and in different societies may in fact have) led different 
ways? What if the elements currently held together as a rationally unified single ideal might be 
separable and not naturally or necessarily joined? All of these possibilities are obscured ex ante by the 
Whig historian’s method. 
 Let me show how this problem of method might apply to Powers’ book. It could be true 
that the Chinese tradition has all of the good things that he discusses in detailed specificity: 
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• a notion of office, a division between public and private; 
• meritocracy; 
• a rejection of group-based politics; and 
• a notion of common good. 
 
Yet at the same time it could also be true that there is a coherent Chinese moral-political vision of 
society that contains all the above elements but also: 
 
• lacks a concept of rights; 
• accepts a hierarchical society; and 
• is fundamentally not individualist. 
 
As suggestive evidence for this claim, I take not my own opinion, nor that of other western 
commentators, but voices from within China—thereby avoiding the problem of Europeans 
projecting their own problems on China (Powers 2019: 20). And I think what is at stake is not a 
failure to live up to accepted ideals (that would be double standards, requiring China to live up to its 
own ideals more than Europe lives up to its (61-2)), but rather a commitment to final ideals which 
are interestingly distinct from Powers’ master-ideal. 
 The key political concept in the Confucian tradition appears to be humaneness (ren), as well 
as perhaps propriety (li). This takes political shape in two ways. First, a ruler should be benevolent 
and proper. They should themselves be virtuous, and their virtue will radiate out to the population; 
the population will respond to their virtue’s magnetism (see, for instance, Analects 2.1; 12.19). 
Second, the virtuous individual should try to extend their benevolence beyond their immediate self, 
to encompass ever expanding circles of others (see, for instance, Mengzi 1A7). 
 This might bear some similarity to contemporary ideas of meritocratic rule and universal 
politico-moral concern. However, late nineteenth-century thinker Liang Qichao makes explicit for us 
how they are different. Liang explains that the Chinese focus on benevolence as opposed to rights gives 
rise to subjects without “rights consciousness”—in consequence, leaving them without resource and 
like meat for slaughter if their ruler should happen not to be benevolent. Liang takes the English as 
exemplars of the rights-consciousness that he believes to be lacking amongst Chinese (Liang 2015: 
9-14).5 Focusing on universality and equality, twentieth-century thinker Chen Duxiu explains that the 
Chinese focus on benevolence within a system of ritually ordered proper relationships requires a 
degree of political (and gender!) deference incompatible with the modern republicanism that he 
finds appealing from western sources (Chen 2015: 70-4).6 Certainly, it is interesting and noteworthy 
that this deference didn’t take hereditary form, but that hardly erases the profound emphasis on 
deference. 
 I turn now to the question of individualism. Powers argues that China offers an 
individualistic and meritocratic social form, rather than a group-based one. But contemporary 
sociologist Fei Xiaotong argues that the structure of Chinese society is neither individualistic nor 
group-based, but relational (Fei 1992: 67).7 Whereas Powers contrasts individualistic versus group 
organization (28), for Fei these two options both fall within the “organisational mode of 
association,” which is to be contrasted with the “differential mode of association” (Fei 1992: 60-70). 
 In this “differential mode of association,” each person is the center of their own relational 
network. Fei offers a vivid image to understand the difference: in the organizational mode, imagine 
bundles of straw bound together to make larger stacks of hay; in the differential mode, imagine the 
widening circles on the surface of a pond when a rock is thrown. On the former, you are a member 
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or not; on the latter, there are not clean membership statuses, but rather, degrees of connection (Fei 
1992: 60-3). Within the differential mode of association, care for humanity does not rest on the 
universal attribution of equal status to all human beings as individuals. Rather, the moral virtuoso’s 
benevolence rests on their success in widening the reach of their concern, out through more and 
more distant relational connections (self, family, local community, wider community, the world), and 
not the attribution of universal status (Fei 1992: 66-70). Indeed, in the tradition, Confucians 
opposed both the Mohists and the Buddhists for their dangerous and irresponsible abstract 
egalitarianism which failed to give central importance to propriety within actual relationships (Fei 
1992: 79). 
 Fei holds that the differential mode is characteristic of most of Chinese society, even if it 
sometimes coexists with the organizational mode. Its political consequence is a particular way of 
understanding identity and obligation. You give and receive through your relationships, and not in 
virtue of your status, either individual or group. There are not rights, but instead there are roles and 
proper bounds of behavior in relation to those roles, and conduct is brought into line with roles 
through a deep life-long moral educational shaping (Fei 1992: 117). 
 What is the upshot of these various differences that I am suggesting between political ideals 
of China and Powers’ master value of social justice? These differences suggest that rather than there 
being a single correct and rational response to the human political condition, different combinations 
and weightings of considerations are possible. Meritocracy needn’t necessarily be good at checking 
the abuse of power; non-group-based politics needn’t be individualistic or respectful of rights. 
Meritocratic China may have featured equality before the law, but at the same time, it featured a 
Confucian insistence on people performing their proper roles within key relationships and it lacked a 
conception of rights. 
 It might be objected that I have offered an unsupportable characterization of Chinese 
political thought. For one instance, consider the value of deference. According to my sketch above, 
Liang criticizes Chinese political culture for valuing deference. But the Han and Song dynasty 
evidence presented by Powers documents well-established practices of frank criticism of governance 
and of rulers (143-65). Thus, whatever the merits of Liang’s claims regarding his late nineteenth 
century context, they cannot be fair as a sweeping characterization of Chinese politics tout court. For 
another instance, even if Confucianism is hierarchical and relational, the same cannot be said of the 
Mohists’ universalism. But I am happy to grant these points. For they show that the Chinese 
political tradition is internally diverse, both synchronically and diachronically—I’m sure there are 
many other dimensions of diversity that could be pointed out beyond these two. But this suggests 
that there is no convergence on a single master political value even within a single tradition, let alone 
across cultures.8 
 Indeed, more generally, and beyond the Chinese case, there are deep tensions between some 
of the conceptual elements that Powers puts together: meritocracy versus equality; meritocracy 
versus democracy; benevolence versus rights. Other elements, even if not in tension, have no 
necessary connection and can come apart: for instance, equality before the law and social justice (in 
the narrow sense of social democratic provision); rule of law and egalitarianism; meritocratic 
government and respect for rights. The connection between these conceptual elements cannot be 
taken for granted but rather needs to be forged, and there will be different ways in which this might 
be done. 
 Nothing here detracts from the core contributions of the book, in showing the significance 
of the Chinese influence on seventeenth- and eighteenth-century English thought, and in showing 
the independent Chinese development of certain kinds of political ideas commonly presumed to be 
the exclusive possession of the “west.” Furthermore, I am not saying that the English radicals of 
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that time were wrong to draw on Chinese ideas. Rather, my point is that there is no unique perfect 
rational set of political values to guide life in complex societies. When the English radicals drew out 
what was useful to them from the Chinese texts, they would have tailored the results to their own 
problems and attempted to integrate them with their own prior value commitments. Some loose 
version of Powers’ structural thesis might be defensible,9 but not the strong form which presumes 
the generic problems of any complex society lead to convergence on the exact same set and ranking 
of values. 
 
 
5 Contemporary Consequences 
 
My criticism of Powers’ structural thesis has implications for his contemporary thesis. Powers shows 
that Song dynasty China developed a notion of office and demanded that political rule focus on the 
common good; he shows how these ideas were explosive politically when they were received in 
England in the eighteenth century. This is all very valuable. But how does this relate to Powers’ 
master notion of social justice, and its linked notion of human rights? Powers succeeds in showing 
that early modern Chinese politics endorsed some of the elements of his social justice. But if we do 
not presume that all the particular values involved in Powers’ social justice stand or fall together, we 
cannot take the presence of certain elements to prove the presence of others. In particular, the 
evidence put forward does not support an early modern Chinese commitment to an idea of human 
rights as universal binding moral claims tied to every human subject. 
 In no way do I mean to reestablish the notion of civilizational essences. The Nietzschean 
historical perspective is just as hostile to civilizational essences as is Powers himself. The state of the 
moral universe of a culture at a given point in space and time says nothing of its future possibilities. 
This applies equally to England and China. Powers observes that the English only jettisoned their 
commitment to social hierarchy based on heredity relatively recently. In the same spirit, the 
weakness within the Chinese tradition of some of the values that Powers holds dear does not 
indicate any deep problem for China. If I am correct, the early modern Chinese political tradition 
lacked a robust notion of rights, but if the Chinese came to or come to find such a notion useful, 
then by all means they should develop such a notion. If the tradition was hierarchical (albeit a 
meritocratic hierarchy), but that is no longer useful, then by all means, reject hierarchy. Indeed, in 
this project, perhaps it will be useful to reach into the past of Chinese history—for instance, Chinese 
thinkers concerned about the deeply patriarchal elements of Confucianism might find it strategic to 
bring forward the fabulous historical images that Powers shares with us of women engaged in 
artistic and scholarly pursuits (16-8) as local inspiration for their struggle. But we cannot presume 
that all roads lead to a single master-understanding of social justice, which will be shared in all places 
around the world. 
 Despite my criticisms of Powers’ three key theses, the broader point of the book is still well 
taken: that seventeenth- and eighteenth-century England rightly looked to China for inspiration to 
develop some of what came to be England’s own core political and institutional values. This 
historical episode upends various contemporary truisms about the nature of global politics, and 
disturbs the self-satisfied self-understandings of anglophone political philosophy. And this is a 
necessary intervention for us today. 
 
Sandra Leonie Field is Assistant Professor of Humanities (Philosophy) at Yale-NUS College. She 
is the author of Potentia: Hobbes and Spinoza on Power and Popular Politics (New York: Oxford, 2020). 
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A Common Struggle? Responding to Martin Powers’  
China and England: The Preindustr ia l  Strugg le  for  Just i c e  in Word and Image  
 
JEFFREY FLYNN 
Fordham University, USA (Jeflynn@Fordham.edu) 
 
 
Martin Powers has written a fascinating book. In many ways, I am unqualified to assess the bulk of 
this project in either its methods or arguments. I am not a historian of China or England. I am not 
an expert on Chinese intellectual history, nor of early modern social and political thought. I am no 
expert on visual culture. I have worked on intercultural dialogue on human rights, though, and I will 
raise some questions related to those aspects of Powers’ project that touch on that toward the end 
of my comments.1 But first, some general points about the book. 
 The book is full of interesting arguments. The core argument is an attempt to show that 
intellectuals in preindustrial England and China shared more common ground than scholars have 
been willing to acknowledge. So the main task Powers takes up is elaborating on those 
commonalities in a series of comparisons—of notions of political authority and its limits, the 
concept of the people, and ideas about equality, political speech, and dissent.  
 There are several types of substantive argument Powers makes in the process, which I return 
to shortly. At another level, there are a number of framing arguments that he uses to situate the project 
in terms of the political stakes and the “cultural politics” that, he maintains, have long dominated the 
historical disciplines that should have been positioned to make more accurate comparisons between 
preindustrial England and China.  
 One example of an issue that comes up here is the double standard he maintains has long 
applied when historians encounter evidence of progressive ideals alongside evidence of those ideals 
being contradicted in practice: historians of China, he argues, are pressed to address such failures in 
practice, while for historians of Europe, he says, “Imperfection is assumed and the faintest hint of 
progressive thinking is hailed as a triumph of the Western spirit” (61). On this point, I’ll just say that 
while Powers documents how some historians during the Cold War fell into this pattern, I do 
wonder if the fields are dominated by such polemics today. I’m really in no position to know. I felt 
that there was a bit of a jump in the book from the eighteenth century to the Cold War and then to 
the present in a way that suggests a fairly continuous “western” view of “China.” I just wonder if 
there are important discontinuities that also might be fruitfully identified. 
 Another framing argument for the book as a whole comes out when Powers refers to the 
contemporary discourse of human rights in the introduction and conclusion of the book. I’ll return 
to this at the end of my comments in order to pose some critical questions.   
 Setting aside the framing arguments for a moment, I think there are (at least) four strands of 
substantive argument in the book. I won’t have much to say about the first three, except to 
acknowledge how interesting they are, and then I’ll have some questions about the fourth argument. 
 The first strand of argument is what I’ll call the Chinese influence argument. Here the claim is 
that the Chinese influence on various positive developments within the early modern west was 
stronger than is often recognized. So, for instance, The Morals of Confucius was available in English as 
of 1691, and Powers indicates the influence of Mencian ideas at various points (96-7; more generally 
see 126-7, 130). At one point in the eighteenth century the use of China as a positive example 
became so popular it was even mocked by opponents as “the argument from the Chinese” (168, 
172). The details of how the perception of China became such an issue of contention among 
western thinkers is all quite fascinating (178-84). 
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 The negative flipside of the Chinese influence argument is a second strand of argument that I’ll 
refer to as the negative comparison argument. Here Powers points out how China was often used as a 
negative example—quite often incorrectly—by western scholars as a way of contrasting some 
positive feature allegedly found in the west with some negative feature allegedly found in China (see 
178-84). Thus began the enduring legacy of the “conventional image of Imperial China as a despotic 
Oriental Regime bent on nothing more than protecting the privileges of an arcane Confucian elite” 
(60). Powers does much valuable work in the book to debunk this image, in part through the third 
strand of argument. 
 That is the visual culture argument. Perhaps this is more of a methodological point than a 
specific type of argument. The point is just that analyzing the respective visual cultures of China and 
England is central to Powers’ project. For instance, he makes the interesting comparative point that 
under a system of privilege, “works of art do not make arguments; declarations are sufficient” 
(224)—“majestic portraits” or a “coat of arms” will do in order to “declare the presence of 
‘authority’” (224). As opposed to this trend, court paintings in the Song period in China referred to 
the meritocratic system and ostensibly made claims that the state was benefiting the people (224). In 
that context, paintings portraying everyday life in China supported the view that the happiness of the 
people was the standard for legitimate government (76-7). I don’t have much to say about all this 
other than to say that I learned a lot from reading the book. More comparative analysis along these 
lines could be fruitful and interesting and could perhaps link up with a recent spate of books on the 
visual culture of human rights and humanitarianism.2 
 The fourth strand of argument is what I will call the “common struggle” argument. This is one of 
the main arguments running through the book, and the gist of the argument is that similar situations in 
China and England led to common experiences and similar struggles. Powers wants to get away from 
cultural essentialist arguments that see certain ideas as simply western or Chinese values. Instead he 
looks to structural, material, and institutional shifts that then give rise to certain ideas and 
arguments. Some examples he cites are the rise of things like: “a monist cosmos”; policy-making that 
is rooted in facts, reason, and public welfare; and legal equality understood in terms of the rejection 
of group membership as a criterion for administrative or judicial action (223). He also points to the 
“separation of court and state” (58), which turns people into objects of state power as opposed to 
subjects of a social superior, and various changes in the status of the “taxpayer” (59). As I already 
mentioned, central to Powers’ argument is to challenge western audiences, who often see these as 
key shifts within western modernity, to also see how such shifts were taking place in China much 
earlier.  
 Powers begins the concluding chapter, titled “A Common Struggle” by saying that: 
 
the most significant bonds linking social justice warriors in China, England, and beyond were 
common cause, structural constraints, and logical necessity. The cause of the many against 
the privileged few is all but universal. It is this dynamic that generates the necessary 
structures of social resistance, so we should not be surprised that guwen intellectuals and the 
leading lights of the Enlightenment shared so many of the same sentiments and values (214). 
 
I have some questions about this argument. First, while I am sympathetic with the attempt to avoid 
a cultural essentialism that relies on absurd generalizations praising the “spirit of the west” or 
denigrating “Chinese despotism,” and I agree that we must attend to social and institutional contexts 
to fully grasp how certain ideas and arguments arise in certain contexts, I wonder if Powers goes too 
far in the opposite direction. How far in a materialist direction does he want to go? Certain 
structures arise and this automatically gives rise to certain ideas? After reading the book, I am not 
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fully clear what specific dynamic gives rise to what he alludes to at various points as social resistance.   
 To be fair, maybe this is not really the way to understand his argument that common 
structures lead to common struggles around common ideals. Perhaps the structural argument is less 
an attempt to thoroughly explain—in a social-scientific vein—precisely what social mechanisms give 
rise to certain modes of resistance and more of an attempt to further undermine the kind of cultural 
essentialism that has tended to dominate such discussions. That is, maybe the point is not to explain 
how structures give rise to struggles but to put forward a model of structures and ideas working in 
tandem to counter models that place too much emphasis on either “western” or “Chinese” ideas as 
untethered from material change. 
 When it comes to this idea of a common struggle, I am of two minds. On the one hand, I 
like the idea that challenges to the privileged few—or struggles against unjustified status 
hierarchies—are certainly not solely modern western inventions. I also like the point about looking 
at the “repertoires of contention” that are available, on the ground, for the vulnerable in concrete 
contexts and noting the variety of institutional forms they can take (see 62 for a great list of these—
for example, the Grievances Offices—and a great point about comparing Song period with pre-
industrial England on this count). 
 On the other hand, I have to admit I bristle a bit at the language of “social justice warriors” 
as applied in this way across so many diverse cases. It may be the case that, as Powers maintains, 
“equality has its origins in meritocracy” (105). And it is fascinating to see a variety of struggles 
against corruption and privilege in the context of the meritocratic bureaucracy of Song period China. 
But if we look at a more radical example of political struggle, like the French Revolution—
something the book takes us right up to the cusp of in its historical analysis—it can be understood 
as an attempt to remake the entire social order on the basis of the equal status of rights-holders. This 
seems to pose a more radical version of equality. In fact, one could argue that it is that revolutionary 
turn, and the language of universality used to make it, that provided the impetus for further struggles 
over the meaning of the universal—struggles for the inclusion by the women, non-Christians, and 
non-whites who were excluded.3 Some of the first successful struggles in the eighteenth-century west 
against the privileged few were started by slightly less privileged men within various hierarchies, men 
who often remained blind to the interests of those less privileged than themselves. My point here is 
not to compare any of the struggles for rights before and after the French Revolution with struggles 
during various periods and contexts in China. Rather, my main point here is just that I wonder if 
Powers extends the idea of a “common struggle” a bit too quickly to preindustrial challenges to 
privilege—in the west and the non-west, across many centuries, all the way up to contemporary 
human rights—in a way that risks losing sight of important distinctions and discontinuities between 
struggles.  
 This brings us to one of the framing arguments I mentioned at the outset, which comes out 
in some remarks on the concept of “rights” and “human rights” in the introduction and conclusion. 
In the introduction, Powers points out that a term like “rights” can be used in two different ways: in 
its “period sense,” to cover, for instance, what the term meant in seventeenth-century England, or in 
its “analytical sense,” as a “rubric for classifying all actions against systemic inequality” (1). On the 
one hand, I think this is a very helpful point when one is looking for analogues across disparate 
struggles—one can miss the commonalities that are often present if one is overly focused on the 
precise language in which struggles get articulated.  
 On the other hand, I think it may be overly broad in scope to extend the analytical sense of 
rights to cover all forms of resistance against inequality. This runs the risk of discarding something 
that seems to me essential to the concept of “rights,” as things people can claim as their rights (in the 
plural), in contrast with the concept of something being “wrong” (the opposite of “right” in the 
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singular) in the sense that it violates some moral principle.4 If that distinction does make a 
difference, then it is likely that it does indeed make a difference when literal “rights”-talk is 
introduced.  
 This relates to my worries about what counts as a “common struggle.” It may be the case 
that if we abstract from the particulars of a time and place and rise up to a high enough level of 
generality, we see certain commonalities. But it is not entirely clear to me what is to be gained from 
doing so. In his introduction, Powers says that he uses a term like “rights” in the book in the 
analytical sense but maintains that this sense “acquires heuristic value only if we attend properly to 
period terms” (3). But what is the heuristic value? It seems to me that the period sense of a term like 
rights has heuristic value in the sense of understanding what is concretely and distinctively at stake in 
various struggles in various times and places.  
 It is less clear, however, what heuristic value there is in grouping a whole bunch of such 
struggles under the heading “social justice warriors.” On the first page of the book, Powers says, 
“we must recognize a long history of struggle for social justice before we can begin to understand the terms 
later devised in support of those struggles” (1, italics added). I’m not fully clear what justifies the “must” 
here. That is, what’s at stake in terms of the order of understanding that requires us to first recognize 
the long history in order to then be able to understand the later, more specific language used in 
various struggles? To be clear, I think the substantive arguments in the book are quite valuable as 
corrections to the historical record in terms of what I called the Chinese influence argument and 
flawed negative comparison arguments between the west and China. What I raise questions about 
here is the broader upshot that Powers alludes to in his framing arguments.  
 One other framing argument comes out in the conclusion when Powers alludes to the 
contemporary discourse on human rights, arguing that 
 
the protection of human rights globally remains handicapped by the group-based idea that 
institutions better calculated to protect individuals from tyranny are the unique expression of 
a Western Spirit of Freedom. Granted few would express it that way but this White 
Nationalist sentiment continues to inform the mainstream discourse of human rights, 
creating insurmountable internal contradictions for social justice warriors (222). 
 
Here I want to say two things. First, again I worry about lumping various people struggling for 
various things in different contexts as “social justice warriors.” More importantly, I want to note that 
there has been an enormous amount of work in recent decades, by anthropologists in particular, on 
how the concept of human rights gets translated and implemented within various contexts.5 While 
there are challenges to this process of translation, to say that western cultural essentialism is 
currently generating “insurmountable internal contradictions” for human rights activists around the 
world strikes me as an overstatement.  
 I worry more, however, about the extent to which the subsequent point Powers makes about 
human rights informs some of the overall aims of the book. Expressing a worry about the 
implications of the claim that the idea of human rights arose in the modern west, Powers says: 
 
If the notion of human rights originally was the outcome of a particular moment in Western 
history, then now it can be dismissed as a noble but dated expression of Western genius, like 
Michelangelo’s drawing method, admirable yet impractical in today’s world (222). 
 
I have a number of concerns about this way of framing things. If this is stated as a reasonable worry, 
then it risks setting up a potentially flawed way of thinking about what is at stake in thinking through 
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thorny issues about human rights, their history, and their contemporary validity. First, it seems to 
give far too much credence to the assumption that the context for the origins of an idea could 
constrain its contemporary validity or legitimacy. Given the tenor of the rest of the book, I don’t 
think Powers would want to support this kind of relativism.6 
 Second, if long-ago origins could constrain contemporary legitimacy in this way, the same 
argument would apply to ideas that arose in pre-industrial China—contemporary Chinese people 
could simply reject such ideas as impractical, like Michelangelo’s drawing method. Again, I don’t 
think Powers would want to suggest that such arguments have any credence. 
 Third, I think this way of framing things avoids addressing certain facts about the history of 
human rights that really do need to be kept in mind (which takes us back to the point about 
analytical vs. period senses of a term). Particular conceptions of human rights really are the outcome 
of particular moments in history—so the Rights of Man as articulated in the French Declaration or 
the codification of human rights in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights are not identical, nor 
were the political stakes or implications of drafting those declarations identical in those particular 
times or particular places. This lesson has been stressed in recent work on the history of human 
rights, by Samuel Moyn in particular.7 Once we dismiss the idea that we should somehow constrain 
the legitimacy or appeal of human rights to one time period or place (my first point above), we still 
have to grapple with the fact that the history of rights-talk is filled with all sorts of discontinuities 
that need to be understood on their own terms. This kind of work is crucial to helping people decide 
which conception of human rights they want to commit themselves to today. In my own approach to this 
question, I argue that this requires engaging in both intra-cultural and inter-cultural dialogues that 
take account of both changing traditions and changing conceptions of human rights, all in full 
awareness that certain features of modernity now constitute a shared global context for dialogue.8 
 A fourth and final point I want to make about this passage, in terms of what it might say 
about the stakes of Powers’ project, is that it runs the risk of making the validity of certain ideas 
depend on the ability to say, “See, China had these ideas too.” That seems problematic to me since it 
seems to make the contemporary validity of human rights within any particular cultural context 
depend not only on (1) being able to find local ideals that might support them—an entirely 
worthwhile enterprise; see chapter 1 of Flynn (2014)—but also on (2) being able to find old local 
versions of the same ideas. Outside China or Europe, if those historical references can’t be found, 
would that undermine the contemporary validity of human rights? I don’t think Powers is necessarily 
committed to this last point, but I worry that some of the rhetoric used in the framing arguments 
risks falling into that position.  
 As I said, this is more about how Powers frames some of the implications of his project. The 
project itself is incredibly valuable, and I learned a tremendous amount from the detailed analysis he 
has marshaled in the book about various commonalities between ideas and struggles in preindustrial 
China and England.  
 
Jeffrey Flynn is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Fordham University in New York City. In 
2013-14, he was a member in the School of Social Science at the Institute for Advanced Study 
(Princeton, NJ). His current research focuses on the historical development and contemporary 
practice of humanitarianism and human rights. His essay “Suffering and Status” is forthcoming in 
ed. Michael Barnett, Humanitarianism and Human Rights: A World of Differences? (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2020). 
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The Politics of Virtue vs. Constitutional Design? A Discussion of Martin Powers’  
China and England: The Preindustr ia l  Strugg le  for  Just i ce  in Word and Image  
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Martin Powers’ fine book presents a deep and refreshing contrast with the “Confucian revivalism” 
or “New Confucianism” that seems to dominate comparative political thought as pertains to East 
Asia. While flawed in some respects, including some highlighted by my co-panelists and some I 
mention below, the main themes of this book are of great relevance and interest to comparative 
political thought and philosophy. Powers’ account is deeply revisionist and useful.  
 I have been lucky enough to travel to China and elsewhere in East Asia a dozen times or 
more since 1997, often to engage in debates or conferences and workshops involving the contrasts 
across East Asian or “Confucian” value systems and ideals of good governance and western liberal 
democratic constitutional models. And it is from that perspective that I want to express my 
profound admiration for this book, and for the ambitions and moral sensibilities that inform it.  
 Powers’ central chapters on political institutions and practices in China and England are 
extremely interesting. The book’s central constructive contribution is to reveal the extent to which 
China was an important and explicit model for those political reformers in eighteenth-century 
England who were calling for greater checks on abuses of power by executive authorities.  
 I was unaware of the extent to which Enlightenment political reformers in eighteenth-
century England invoked Chinese practices and institutions, described in Chinese texts that had 
been translated and anthologized, as models for political reform in England, especially in the wake 
of the Walpole administration. Indeed, arguments about the superiority of Chinese institutions were 
invoked with such frequency that skeptical opponents scoffed at what they called “the argument 
from the Chinese” (Powers 2019: 168).  
 Powers’ discussion of Chinese institutions provides a refreshing contrast with many 
contemporary discussions in the burgeoning field of comparative political thought and philosophy. I 
mean specifically those texts that invoke East Asian, broadly “Confucian” ideas about politics and 
ethics as counterpoints to western liberal and democratic models. Well-known scholars in the line of 
work include Daniel A. Bell, who has written extensively on what he and others call “The New 
Confucianism.” His best known work may be his recent book, The China Model: Political Meritocracy 
and the Limits of Democracy (2015).1 There Bell defends a meritocratic political system that includes 
one-party authoritarianism as superior to multi-party competition when it comes to fostering 
competent and forward-looking political rule oriented to the long-term good of the community as a 
whole. Other contributors to this literature who are friendlier to liberalism include the philosopher 
Stephen Angle, whose many books explore the virtue ethical resources of what he styles 
“progressive Confucianism.”2 In addition, there is the Hong Kong-based philosopher, Joseph Chan,3 
and Fudan University professor, Tongdong Bai.4 Each of them have differing proposals for an 
upper legislative house constituted on the basis of virtue and merit, perhaps involving performance 
reviews and peer selection among public officials, exam results, or other markers of competence, 
and hopefully, wisdom and virtue. These scholars eschew political authoritarianism but look to East 
Asian traditions and culture for resources to promote a more ethically oriented politics of virtue.  
The current western crisis of democracy, exemplified by the Trump presidency and the wider 
phenomenon of populism, furnishes fertile ground for those seeking alternatives to western liberal 
democracy.  
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 A relative weakness in many of these works (interesting and valuable as they are), and the 
discussions at conferences that take place around them, is a tendency to neglect exactly the sorts of 
institutions and practices that Martin Powers does focus on: that is, bureaucratic independence, 
checks and balances, accountability mechanisms, and the structure and interrelation of various 
offices. The neglect of these mechanisms in the Chinese historical context has the effect of 
exaggerating the differences between Confucian virtue politics and western constitutionalism.  For 
example, at a workshop that I attended in March, 2019, in Shanghai—organized by Peter Bol and 
James Hankins, and inspired by Bell’s The China Model—western historians of political thought and 
political theorists came together to discuss the comparisons that might be made across the western 
and East Asian Confucian traditions. Participants in this discussion tended to link Confucian 
political and ethical traditions with western classical, medieval, and early-modern traditions that saw 
good politics as centrally a matter of cultivating virtue and selecting virtuous rulers. We can call that 
model virtue politics. In contrast, these discussions and others like them tend to describe western, 
liberal democratic models of constitutional government as excessively preoccupied with 
constitutional mechanisms such as checks and balances and the separation of powers.  The contrast 
is not altogether wrong, but it is easily exaggerated.   
 Illustrative of this tendency, on the western side, is the important book by Renaissance 
historian James Hankins, Virtue Politics: Political Thought in Renaissance Italy from Petrarch to Machiavelli.5 
Hankins, like Powers, points out important linkages across the Chinese and European contexts, and 
argues that “Like the classically trained administrators of the British Empire two centuries later, the 
mandarin philosophers of China were all-rounders, and their education in Confucian ethics made 
them ‘competent to pass judgment on any subject, however far distant it is from their own calling.’” 
The common ground emphasized by Hankins is a classical education grounded in ancient texts:  
 
 both Confucians and Italian humanists discovered similar means to recover those traditions 
and revive the virtue of the ancients: the study and imitation of ancient authors. Those who 
studied the ancient texts would constitute a new nobility, based on merit and not heredity; 
they would deserve their places because of their moral training and knowledge of the 
classics. Hierarchies of power were to be justified by the possession of superior virtue. Even 
the textual practices of the Confucian scholar-officials, such as memorization and 
commentary on classical texts, as well as original compositions in the style of ancients, 
written in beautiful literary hands, resemble those of the humanists (Hankins 2019: 499). 
 
Hankins thus emphasizes the parallels between “Confucian dezhi, virtuous rule,” and the virtue 
politics of the Italian renaissance. While emphasizing that “Confucian ideals of government lasted in 
imperial China for close to 1800 years, from the Han dynasty, approximately coeval with the Roman 
Empire, to the end of the Qing dynasty in 1905,” he bemoans the fact that, in the west, “Virtue 
politics was replaced by constitutional, rights-based, contractarian approaches to the justification and 
ordering of political power.” As he summarizes:  
 
To put the difference far too simply, virtue politics aimed primarily to lead those who held 
power to be good and wise; constitutional thought aimed primarily to limit the damage that 
might be done by bad and foolish rulers. The master-values of Renaissance political 
meritocracy were virtue and practical wisdom; the master-values of constitutionalism were 
freedom and the rule of law (Hankins 2019: 500). 
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We in the west forgot that “soulcraft is prior to statecraft,” yet we cannot “force obedience or solve 
social problems” simply by passing more laws and “strengthening the apparatus of surveillance and 
enforcement” (Hankins 2019: 506). 
 Hankins is surely right to worry about the condition of our public moral culture. I agree, 
moreover, that we need urgently to attend to the project of fostering greater moral sensitivity, 
wisdom, competence, public-spiritedness, and civic virtue among citizens and elites.6 Equally 
importantly, we need to find ways to temper or moderate the toxic partisanship that currently 
poisons public discussions of common concerns. Nevertheless, proponents of virtue politics 
frequently exaggerate the extent to which modern constitutional and liberal traditions left behind the 
concern with virtue.7 I would also add this: statecraft is soulcraft. The indirectly educative and 
formative effects of our major institutions is likely far more consequential with respect to moral 
formation and the character of our public moral culture than the pedagogy and curricula of high 
schools and universities. Don’t get me wrong: I would favor requiring students to spend more time 
reading and studying great books in western and non-western traditions. Yet by itself the reform of 
higher education curricula would not accomplish much to repair our badly fractured politics in the 
US. I do not pretend to have a formula for accomplishing this daunting task. 
 In addition, we should understand constitutional checks and various mechanisms for holding 
power-holders accountable not as substitutes for virtue but as ways of structuring it and eliciting it, 
while also providing backstops for when it fails. The  fact confirmed by the Trump impeachment 
hearings is that constitutional checks intended to guard against corruption can only work if the 
checking institutions are themselves staffed by morally honorable people. The impeachment 
hearings also demonstrated that professionalism and moral integrity are far from absent among 
members of America’s diplomatic corps and civil service. 
 Two strong themes that run through Powers’ book are useful in relation to the question of 
virtue’s relation to well-designed constitutional institutions. One of these is explicit, the other more 
implicit, but both strike me as of great importance. 
 Powers’ explicit theme is the emphasis on structures, institutions, and checks on the abuse of 
power as important in both the Chinese and the western contexts.  
 The implicit theme, of equal importance, is that it makes no sense to think of well-working 
bureaucratic and constitutional institutions as separate or separable from a system of education 
(understood broadly) and a wider culture that cultivates sufficient competence, virtue, and public-
spiritedness. Much of Powers’ book is taken up with presenting and analyzing many forms of visual 
media, some of which present, for example, scenes that arrange displays of power and majesty, or, in 
contrast, power and accountability. These I take it are presented as, in effect, parts of the educative 
and formative environment, or public culture, of the societies from which they originate: the images 
are examined to see how they both reflect and convey teachings about political values. But I also 
take it that, for Powers, institutionalized checks and accountability mechanisms were part of how 
China structured and supported competence and uprightness in public office.  
 Let me say a few more words about both of these themes.  
 First, then, is Powers’ explicit and repeated emphasis on the importance of “structure”—
meaning social structures and institutions—in helping us understand and appreciate commonalities 
across different cultures and time periods. He repeatedly insists that commonalities across China and 
the west, or England specifically, are structural. Powers put the point especially clearly in a a recent 
essay, where he explains his central premise: “both formal and informal practices for checking the 
power of the topmost authority—monarch, premier, or president—are products of structural 
necessity. Such checks arise from the character of the top executive power, which by nature is prone 
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to abuse. Attempts to justify such mechanisms may be found in many cultural traditions” (Powers 
2019: 300). 
 This is a very important point, though one needs to be careful not to press the identification 
of commonalities too far: the creation of a strong centralized state apparatus calls for the creation of 
insitutions designed to check abuses of power, and this is true in both the East Asian and western 
contexts. 
 A similar point has been advanced by Loubna El Amine, a professor of political theory at 
Northwestern University. Her 2016 essay in Perspectives on Politics is entitled, “Beyond East and West: 
Reorienting Political Theory through the Prism of Modernity.” The themes of this essay are similar 
to the central premise of Powers’ book: 
 
While critiquing the dominance of the Western tradition in the discipline of political theory, 
recent methodological discussions in Comparative Political Theory (CPT) fail to move 
beyond the East-West dichotomy. More specifically, CPT does not offer the resources to 
deal with global convergence as embodied in the phenomenon of modernity. I focus on the 
emergence of the sovereign state in the modern period and argue that the universal 
acceptance of the state form creates a globally-shared institutional condition. This condition, 
in turn, necessitates a shared normative and conceptual apparatus centered on ideals like 
constitutionalism, rights, and democracy (El Amine 2016: 102, emphasis added).  
 
El Amine proceeds to draw two implications from her argument, the first of which is relevant here: 
“we should reconceptualize the history of political thought such that we move from an East/West 
division to a modern/pre-modern division” (El Amine 2016: 102). 
 Perhaps, however, the “modern/pre-modern” distinction is not quite right, at least insofar as 
Powers would insist that China developed the rudiments of effective state institutions in a pre-modern 
context. El Amine’s crucial point is that when effective state institutions develop—capable of laying 
down law, collecting taxes, and governing a territory in a way that directly impinges on individuals, 
cutting through the layers of group-based authority structures, affiliations, and statuses characteristic 
of feudalism—then a common and fundamental problematic develops, which is to curb abuses of 
power and make sure power is directed toward the public good.  
 El Amine’s essay is a sensible and important intervention in comparative political thought, 
and Powers’ book in effect expands on her central theme. Students of comparative political thought 
and philosophy should pay attention. While that burgeoning discipline has often been preoccupied 
with emphasizing the centrality, in the Chinese and wider East Asian context, of a communitarian 
politics of virtuous rule that is held up as superior to the western liberal democratic politics of equal 
rights, individualism, suspicion of power, and constitutional checks and balances, Powers argues for 
the importance in Chinese political traditions of bureaucratic institutions and administrative practices that 
allow the politically powerful to be held accountable. Indeed, he very usefully develops a point also made by 
Jonathan Israel, a leading intellectual historian: that Chinese practices of accountability and checks 
on power were deeply influential on Enlightenment political reformers in Europe.   
 An equally central theme running alongside Powers’ emphasis on the importance of 
structural similarities across China and England is the broad contrast he draws, following Charles 
Tilly, between opposed types of social systems. The contrasting models are somewhat crude but 
nevertheless suggestive.  
 One social type is described by the idea of “inequality generating systems that distribute 
positions based on group memberships” (Powers  2019: 28). But “group membership” is too vague: 
the core idea here is society organized on the basis of inherited, hierarchically organized castes or 
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classes into which one is born. Powers cites Arthur O. Lovejoy’s idea of a “Great Chain of Being” as 
a description of pre-modern feudal society, governed by an aristocracy based on noble birth 
(Lovejoy 1971).8 And he says that this was also true of Tang China (618-907) in which, as in 
medieval Europe, authority was associated with noble birth.9  
 The other model is described as “sorting systems that distribute roles based on individual 
characteristics” (28), such as merit, ability, and virtue. Crucially, Powers insists that in vital respects, 
China’s success, which so impressed early modern Europeans, resulted from its development (in the 
Song Dynasty, 960-1279) of a post-aristocratic “sorting society,” in which selection for important 
offices (though not every position of power) was based on individual merit, individually assessed, 
including via examinations. 
 Also crucial to the post-aristocratic “sorting” model based on individual competence was the 
idea of public office, which Powers persuasively suggests was understood by Chinese thinkers in 
texts that may date to the third century BCE. He translates the relevant passages thus:  
 
The ancient sages did not presume that all people are capable in the same way, and so did 
not assign to all officials the same sorts of tasks. People were assigned tasks on the basis of 
their actual performance, and the appropriateness of their rank and role was determined on 
the basis of what was suitable for their talents. This is called promoting prosperity through 
intelligent selection (The Zhuangzi, quoted on 37).  
 
An idea of meritocratic governance emerged, Powers argues, when these ideas about individual 
capabilities of various sorts was wedded to a part of bureaucratic theory called mingshi theory. On 
this account, “every office/zhi should consist of a legal description specifying its duties, powers, and 
jurisdiction. This description was called a ming.” On the mingzhi theory, performance (shi) is assessed 
in light of the nature of the office: offices generate standards for good performance and public 
grounds for assessment (xing). Heredity, personal connections, and other irrelevant considerations 
were to be excluded, with performance instead judged on the basis of appropriate public standards 
or measures (shu). Associated with all of this was a distinction between the interests of persons in 
their private capacities (si), and public interests, responsibilities, and powers (gong) (36-40).  
 Powers further elaborates these points by reference to Song period paintings in which, as he 
says, “the concept of political authority is invoked in a manner implying its abstraction from the 
social status of the officer” (40).     
 Central also to the institutions and culture that Powers describes as well-developed in China 
and influential on western thinking are practices that are also, albeit in different forms, central to 
western constitutional traditions. These are practices of political speech, complaint, petition, and 
appeal, aimed at requiring public officials to justify their policies and actions (or inaction) in public and 
to the people, or at least, in the Chinese context, pleading with them to do so within a system that, 
overall, must have been far more hierarchical than what we know in constitutional democracies 
today. 
 Powers describes political speech as a central practice in Song China: “formal channels for 
popular feedback” gave voice and some degree of agency to ordinary people without social status. 
This was partly via a Department of Investigation, and also a Grievance Office that had a mandate 
“to collect and act upon complaints from the people” (58). Grievance officers, according to a history 
of the Song Dynasty, were charged with receiving memorials from the people, “both educated and 
ordinary,” to expose faults with court policies, and “conflicts between public and private interests, 
military and security matters, recommend men for appointment, report disasters […], dispute the 
qualifications of officers” (59).  
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 As Powers summarizes, “the meritocratic system with its blind examinations and 
prioritization of facts, as well as the Department of Investigation and other formal checks, 
continued throughout the Song and beyond into later dynasties.” While acknowledging that the 
system was far from perfect in practice, Powers cites examples of imperial relatives and high-ranking 
officials being punished severely for abusing bondservants (60-1). Important also, as he indicates, in 
encouraging public officials to take public complaints seriously is the need for tax revenues and the 
hope to avoid popular riots.  
 It was these institutions for checking abuses of official power and providing channels for 
popular criticism that impressed Enlightenment political reformers in England and elsewhere in the 
eighteenth century. As Jonathan Israel has also written of this period, “the radical [Enlightenment] 
fraternity deployed the Chinese example as a weapon in a war against social hierarchies based on 
birth and lineage” (Israel 2006: 559, quoted in Powers 2019: 132).  
 Powers describes the influence on eighteenth-century English political reformers of 
translations of Chinese texts, such as The Morals of Confucius (English edition, 1691), without always 
being entirely clear about how direct and clear was that influence. Nevertheless, there seem to be 
enough parallel themes and direct references to know that China was influential. Samuel Johnson, 
for example, wrote reviews of Jean-Baptiste Du Halde’s Histories of China (published in English 
editions in 1735 and 1738), attesting that the reader, 
 
will enjoy all the pleasures that novelty can afford, when he becomes acquainted with the 
Chinese government and constitution; he will be amazed to find there is a country where 
nobility and knowledge are the same, where men advance in rank as they advance in 
learning, and promotion is the effect of virtuous industry, where no man thinks ignorance a 
mark of greatness, or laziness the privilege of high birth (Johnson quoted in Powers 2019: 
132). 
 
Similarly, a 1732 English translation of B. Le Stourgeon’s A Compleat Universal History of the Several 
Empires, Kingdom’s and States &c. Throughout the Known World… (London: B. Baddam, 1732-38), 
described China’s controls on abuses of power as “checks,” which included, “periodic, written 
reports; term limits; the exclusion of wealth or ‘parentage’ in assessing qualifications for office; fixed 
salaries; and regular reviews followed by promotion or demotion” (quoted in Powers 2019: 133). 
 While Powers’ account of these various selection and assessment mechanisms is fascinating, 
one might want to hear more about how effective they actually were. Powers seems to suggest that 
China had institutionalized practices of complaint-transmission which approximated, to some 
degree, western institutions of free press and freedom of speech, or at least, freedom to petition the 
government for a redress of grievances.  
 Yet it would be a mistake to equate, as Powers sometimes does, the existence of 
opportunities for ordinary people to petition or plead with elites to redress their grievances with the 
modern institutionalized practice of individual rights. In modern liberal constitutional settings, 
citizens have access to politically independent courts of law where they can demand that their rights 
be respected by public officials.  It seems doubtful that the peremptory character of modern rights 
applied to the sorts of pleas described by Powers in Song China. One might also ask this: in what 
periods of its history did China develop a sufficiently free public culture which, when combined with 
capable state institutions, allowed it to achieve the condition that Amartya Sen identifies in 
Development as Freedom: namely, that enough information circulates, and state institutions are 
sufficiently responsive, that there are no famines?10  
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 In any case, I interpret Powers’ discussion as insisting on a close linkage between a politics 
of virtue and a politics of well-designed institutions, including bureaucratic procedures, a strong 
sense of the public nature of official responsibilities, audits of official accounts by independent 
officials, checks and balances, and public contestation in the form of complaints and pleas. These 
constitutional structures are not substitutes for a politics of virtue—a point that is frequently 
mistaken in western discussions of constitutional institutions—but a way of structuring institutions 
so as to call forth particular virtues associated with specific official roles. In addition, virtuous 
behavior is encouraged by the prospect that institutional checks and accountability mechanisms may 
call to account official misbehavior. At work, in other words, are both positive models of good 
performance with promises of promotion and esteem associated with meritorious conduct in office, 
but also the negative sanctions associated with being called publicly to account for poor 
performance and corruption.  
 These and other institutional mechanisms are not substitutes for virtue so much as ways of 
eliciting virtue by distinguishing particular official roles with associated powers and responsibilities in 
a larger system, and providing backstops for when virtue fails. I appreciate what I take to be Powers’ 
emphasis that good government is impossible without well-working institutions and practices that 
are, and are publicly understood to be, oriented toward seeking the truth, or, as Powers puts it: 
government must be based on “facts” and reason.  
 Here I find the second, implicit theme, referenced earlier, that responds to the “virtue 
ethics” orientation of so much Confucian-inspired comparative political thought today. The 
institutions of good governance and accountability cannot work well unless we also sustain a wider 
educative culture in which the people and public officials play their roles with adequate competence 
and conscientiousness. Which is to say that neither in the east nor the west can we leave virtue 
altogether aside by placing our faith in institutional checks and accountability mechanisms. I agree 
with the advocates of virtue politics on this score, and I believe that Powers does as well. 
 And here Powers contributes an important dimension to this discussion, which befits a 
professor of art history who also writes on Chinese bureaucracy. His discussion in this book 
suggests that we should understand the educative environment to include works of art and material 
culture. And so he includes depictions and discussions of many and various visualizations of scenes 
in which power is displayed, emphasizing its majesty to elicit awe, or, in contrast, the importance of 
situating power-holders among ordinary people who are empowered to question and ask for 
reasons.  
  I also have some quibbles and criticisms. These are partly a function of this book’s wide 
sweep. Powers has a tendency to press his structure-based argument too far, in ways that can be 
reductive and simplistic. Quoting a twelfth-century Chinese text that provides an entirely “secular” 
account of politics, Powers remarks that, “the lesson to be learned here is that any attempt to 
establish genuine legal equality requires the elimination of religious considerations by structural 
necessity” (56). Remarks such as this, which go too far, make the book less than altogether 
successful. Likewise, I share the concerns of the other participants in this symposium concerning 
some of the parallels that Powers draws across vastly different cultural contexts and time periods, 
including, as already mentioned, with respect to the discourse and practice of rights. Powers draws 
interesting parallels between practices and ideas in Song China and eighteenth-century England, and 
in both cases, there were those who fought against abuses of power and unfair inequalities. Granting 
also that both societies were “preindustrial,” I am skeptical that politics in these vastly different 
settings can usefully be characterized as exhibiting a common struggle for justice, as Powers seems 
to suggest.  
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 Nevertheless, there is much to learn from this book, and engagement with it could help to 
usefully broaden frames of reference in comparative political thought. At the panel discussion from 
which this symposium originated, Powers provided an explanation for the contrast between his 
account, with its central focus on administrative procedures and checks on abuses of power, and the 
focus of much contemporary writing by political theorists and philosophers on virtue ethics. He said 
that whereas most contemporary theorists focus on philosophical texts that mainly functioned to 
describe ideals and aspirations for rule, he reads policy documents which are far more informative 
about how politics actually worked. This sounds plausible to me, though I am in no position to 
assess whether it is correct. Nevertheless, I hope other scholars follow up on the useful leads 
valuably set out by Martin Powers.   
 In the background of Martin Powers’ book, and the scholarly works discussed earlier 
emphasizing a politics of virtue, is the plight of politics in our time. Like the scholars of Confucian 
revivalism in East Asia and of virtue revivalism in the west, Martin Powers finds resources in 
Chinese traditions and practices that could prove instructive for us. I applaud the unusual balance he 
brings to this endeavor. Powers gives us a picture in which the politics of meritocratic rule and 
virtue is tightly bound up with institutions designed to check abuses of power and hold officials 
publicly accountable to facts and reasons via constitutional and bureaucratic institutions. I would 
hope that his account might help us get past overdrawn contrasts that too often dominate 
discussions of politics ancient and modern, and east and west.  
 
Stephen Macedo is the Laurance S. Rockefeller Professor of Politics and the University Center for 
Human Values at Princeton University. He is President of the Americal Society for Political and 
Legal Philosophy and, since 2013, a member of the American Academy of Arts and Science. His 
many writings include Just Married: Same-Sex Couples, Monogamy, and the Future of Marriage (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2015). 
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Reconceptualizing Received Notions: Reading Martin Powers’ China and England  
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Martin Powers’ China and England: The Preindustrial Struggle for Justice in Word and Image is a radically 
subversive book in the sense that it challenges and destabilizes a whole set of concepts and ideas 
that have been widely accepted and believed to be characteristic of China and England as 
representative of two fundamentally different value systems. It is now almost “common sense” to 
assume, for example, that China is a country ruled by tyrannical emperors and rulers, while the west 
has democratic systems of citizens in possession of equal rights; and that the Chinese form a 
collective at the expense of individuality, while the west puts emphasis on the individual and 
individual choices. As Powers observes, “it is likely that many Americans believe to this day that the 
West has always been more egalitarian and more individualistic than China, or anywhere else, 
throughout all time” (22). Indeed, “‘China’s’ role as bête noir for the ‘West’ has become a constitutive 
element in academic and journalistic discourse” (23). By revisiting some old documents and 
exploring historical materials, Powers presents a counterargument and makes the bold claim that all 
those received notions are wrong or based on very shaky grounds, and that some of the basic 
“western” notions are actually anticipated by, and even borrowed from, preindustrial China. If 
anything, China had generated some of those basic notions much earlier than Europe, and these are 
not minor notions or values, but the basis of a just and rational governance and political system—
values such as equality, rights, justice, etc. In the discussion of Powers’ book, I would like first to 
support his argument by providing some other evidences from Chinese sources, and secondly, to 
relate his new book to a number of works done by other scholars in the same spirit of presenting a 
different perspective on China and Europe and reconceptualizing some of the received notions 
concerning the two. I see Powers’ book as a significant contribution to this emerging tendency in 
recent scholarship to challenge some of the predominant notions in the perception of China and its 
history and to present a corrective for a better cross-cultural understanding.  
 From a fairly early time, the Chinese had already developed ideas about governance that are 
more just than the hereditary aristocratic system in Europe. “By Han times,” says Powers, “authority 
was contained within an office and exercised for a time, according to rules, by an officer” (39). That 
is to say, an office (zhi 職) defines the power, authority, prerogatives, and responsibilities of a certain 
government or administrative position, and the office-holder, an official or a magistrate (guan 官), is 
expected to execute all that he is entitled or charged to perform by his office. If he does things 
beyond the limits or in violation of what is legally valid for his office, he would be guilty of abusing 
his office (duzhi 瀆職) and thus punishable. In the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries, the 
Chinese political system was evidently more advanced than the European ancien régime, so much so 
that even “mathematically sophisticated Europeans such as Louis Le Comte experienced difficulty 
grasping the distinction between the officer and the office. Likewise the formal distinction between 
court and state, as practiced in China, came as a surprise to many Europeans who traveled there, 
suggesting that the concept of the polity in France or England did not yet require as firm a 
distinction between the two” (45). This was so because “in Song, Ming, and Qing China, the people 
paid taxes to the state, not to the court,” says Powers, and as a result, there was “the logical 
distinction between public/gong and private/si” (40), which challenges yet another received notion 
that the distinction between the public and the private is uniquely western. By examining some 
historical documents and images, Powers shows with textual and pictorial evidence that many of the 
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received notions about China and the west—important ideas such as political authority, people, 
equality, and speech—must be reconceptualized for more adequate understanding. “In sum, the 
weight of primary source evidence flatly contradicts the conventional image of Imperial China as a 
Despotic Oriental Regime bent on nothing more than protecting the privileges of an arcane 
Confucian elite,” says Powers. All those original texts suggest that “by Song times, factual evidence 
had become the standard requirement for policy action, with benefit to the people being the 
normative criterion” (60). The significance of Powers’ book lies not only in recognizing the great 
contributions to progressive polity made by what he calls the “unsung justice warriors of all races” 
and in paying homage to them, but in promoting cross-cultural understanding for a more just and 
more peaceful world by appealing to “a shared Reason buried deep within the heart of humankind, a 
reason that always subsists, and is everywhere apparent to those who listen” (229). Given the 
economic and political realities of the world we are living in today, it is extremely important to listen 
to that voice of Reason and to overcome the cultural and political dichotomies artificially and 
ideologically created between China and the west.  
 In support of Powers’ effort to present correctives to some of the commonly received but 
erroneous notions, I would like to offer more textual evidence from different sources to illustrate 
the point. Mencius, the second sage in the Confucian tradition, whom Powers also mentions in the 
book, made the famous statement that “people (min 民) is the most precious, society the second, and 
the prince the least” (民為貴，社稷次之，君為輕).1 This has a profound influence in the history of 
Chinese political thought, and as Powers observes, “By Song times the people, the min, were 
regarded as both the object of state action, and the raison d’être of the state” (72). The idea that the 
prince or the ruler should take the people’s interest as the foremost and try to win their hearts 
underpins the political theories and administrative policies of much of what Powers discusses. That 
has been made quite clear in his book, so I would like to discuss some other issues. A common 
misleading notion has it that the Chinese always see themselves in relation to a collective entity—the 
family or the community and society at large—while the west has always put emphasis on the 
individual and free individual choice. When the emperor gives an order, there is no way for a 
Chinese person to disobey. If that is what you believe, then you are in for a big surprise when you 
read the simple poem written by a scholar in fifth-century China, which offers a remarkably 
compelling proof of the kind of personal freedom and human dignity that are so often identified as 
uniquely modern and western values. Tao Hongjing (陶宏景 457–537) was a hermit, a Daoist 
philosopher, and an expert of herbal medicine who had such a high reputation of great erudition 
that emperors wanted his counsel and advice. He preferred, however, to be left alone in the 
mountains rather than serving the emperor at court. In the year 480, Emperor Gao of Qi 齊高帝 sent 
him an edict to demand his service, in which the Emperor asked what was there in the mountains 
that could possibly offer more than the comfortable life of a royal counsellor. Tao Hongjin wrote a 
simple poem in reply, in just four lines: 
 
 山中何所有？ 
 嶺上多白雲。 
 只可自怡悅， 
 不堪持贈君。2 
 
What is there in these mountains? 
Lots of white clouds on tops so high, 
Which I can only enjoy by myself, 
But can’t hand in to your majesty.  
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This is indeed a simple poem in a simple language, written in lieu of a reply to the Emperor’s 
question, and the reply is basically “Nothing”! The immaterial, constantly changing, and evaporating 
white clouds serve as an excellent metaphor for the Daoist idea of wu (無 nothingness) or the 
Buddhist concept of sunyata (kong 空 emptiness), which the poet as a religious hermit understood 
deeply and valued highly; it is something he knew only he could appreciate in the mountains, but not 
some material goods he could present to the emperor or enjoy in the emperor’s court with all its 
pomp and opulence. So the hermit stayed undisturbed in the mountains and the emperor ceased to 
bother him.  
 Though the poem makes no direct reference to Zhuangzi, the great Daoist philosopher, a 
famous passage from the Zhuangzi may help us read this poem with better understanding, as Daoism 
was indeed very influential at the time when Tao Hongjin lived. In the “Autumnal Waters” chapter 
of the Zhuangzi, we find this rather interesting story: Zhuangzi was angling for fish by the River Pu, 
while a tortoise was crawling by his side slowly in the mud. Having heard of Zhuangzi as a profound 
thinker, the King of Chu sent two envoys to him and offered him the office of the prime minister, 
but Zhuangzi was not at all interested. The philosopher had a wonderful conversation with the two 
envoys. “I heard there is a tortoise for divination in the kingdom of Chu, already dead for three 
thousand years,” Zhuangzi said. “The king puts it in a bamboo basket and covers it with cloth, and 
stores it up in a shrine of the palace. Now for that tortoise,” Zhuangzi asked, “would it prefer being 
dead and having its bones so revered? Or would it rather be alive and wag its tail in the mud?” The 
two envoys said, “It would rather be alive and wag its tail in the mud.” “Then go!” said Zhuangzi. 
“I’d rather wag my tail in the mud.”3 Even though Tao Hongjin doesn’t refer to this Zhuangzi 
passage explicitly, his poem evidently shows the same spirit of personal dignity and free individual 
choice as memorably expressed in the Zhuangzi story about “wagging his tail in the mud.” Reading 
Tao Hongjin’s poem, we may have a much more enriched experience if we recall that Zhuangzi 
passage and feel inspired by the same sense of pride and human dignity, a sense of spiritual nobility, 
and the idea of personal choice and individual freedom.  
 The above example is valuable because it destabilizes our received notion of western 
individualism versus Chinese collectivism, and shows the necessity of rethinking and 
reconceptualization. Of course, many scholars are our predecessors who tried to do just that. In as 
early as the 1920s, Adolf Reichwein (1898-1944) was such a pioneer, arguing for the importance of 
China for the European Enlightenment in his book China and Europe. Reichwein was an eminent 
figure in German education, particularly adult education and continuing education for teachers after 
the First World War. In 1930, he became a professor of history and political science at the Academy 
of Education in Halle, but was dismissed for political reasons in 1933 when the Nazis seized power. 
He took a job as an elementary schoolteacher in Tiefensee near Berlin, and later as an educator at 
the Folklore Museum in Berlin. In 1940, Reichwein joined the Kreisau Circle as a member of the 
resistance against Adolf Hitler. He was arrested by the Gestapo in July 1944 and was sentenced to 
death and killed on October 20, 1944. Reichwein was not a Sinologist, but with his erudition and his 
political vision for Europe after the First World War, he published his book on China in the eyes of 
eighteenth-century Europe. In the wake of the First World War, Reichwein’s book had special 
relevance to Europe, when recovery from the devastation of war and the realization of east-west 
spiritual connections seemed particularly important. Most young people in postwar Europe had an 
“often eschatological yearning for an inward development,” says Reichwein, and they found a 
spiritual source in Chinese Daoism and its emphasis on wu wei or non-action. “Lao Tzŭ came as a 
great luminary. The Tao Tē Ching became for the present generation a bridge between East and 
West” (Reichwein 1925: 4-5).4 In the free-flowing, asymmetrical, and graceful lines and shapes of the 
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art of the Rococo, Reichwein detected the influence of Laozi and Daoist naturalism, and in the 
rational order and the humanistic ideal of the Enlightenment, he saw a connection with Confucian 
intellectualism. Confucianism made a most favorable impression on the Enlightenment philosophers 
as a moral  
and political philosophy based on reason rather than religious faith, and Reichwein claimed that 
“Confucius became the patron saint of eighteenth-century Enlightenment” (Reichwein 1925: 77).  
 In the 1940s, Arthur Lovejoy, an eminent scholar in the history of ideas, wrote a learned 
essay with a title that may be surprising even today, “The Chinese Origin of a Romanticism,” in 
which he argues that “by the beginning of the seventeenth century, the Chinese already figured in 
European eyes as, above all, masters in the great practical art of government. And as such they 
continued to figure for nearly two hundred years” (Lovejoy 1948: 103).5 The Chinese examination 
system was widely thought to be the realization of Plato’s dream of a state ruled by “philosophers.” 
“Admission to the public service required definite and exacting educational qualifications, tested by 
examinations, and evidence of personal character and competence,” says Lovejoy, and he reminds 
his readers by quoting a Jesuit missionary Nicolas Trigault as evidence that in China, “the holding of 
any political office depends upon proved knowledge, virtue, prudence and ability” (Lovejoy 1948: 
104). His main purpose, however, is to point out the influence of the Chinese style of garden as 
close to nature in forming a new aesthetic sensibility different from that of neo-classicism and thus 
issuing forth some basic ideas of European romanticism. “A turning-point in the history of modern 
taste was reached,” says Lovejoy, “when the ideals of regularity, simplicity, uniformity, and easy 
logical intelligibility, were first openly impugned, when the assumption that true beauty is 
‘geometrical’ ceased to be one to which ‘all consented, as to a Law of Nature.’ And in England, at all 
events, the rejection of this assumption seems, throughout most of the eighteenth century, to have 
been commonly recognized as initially due to the influence and the example of Chinese art” 
(Lovejoy 1948: 135).  
 A monumental work was accomplished in the 1960s by Donald Lach in publishing his 
multivolume book, which discusses the interrelations and mutual influence of Asia and Europe and 
presents a very different picture from what was the predominant view at the time. He searched 
through a tremendous amount of materials and demonstrated how European thinkers since the early 
modern time had drawn inspiration and built models from what they had learned from Asia. In the 
sixteenth century, for instance, Michel de Montaigne described China as a country “without 
commerce or knowledge of ours, the government and arts surpass our examples in many aspects of 
excellence,” and how Chinese history made him realize “how much greater and more diverse the 
world is than either the ancients or we ourselves have penetrated” (Montaigne 1972: 360).6 As Lach 
points out, Montaigne “uses the East to support his beliefs about the uncertainty of knowledge, the 
infinite variety in the world, and the universality of moral precepts”; he saw in China “an example 
for Europe that he never discerned elsewhere in the overseas world” (Lach 1965: 297).7 In the long 
global history, Asia and Europe have had numerous contacts and mutual influence, but for a long 
time, such contacts and mutual influence were suppressed or minimized in much of western 
scholarship. By discovering or rediscovering the importance of Asia for Europe, Lach made a 
significant contribution to a better understanding of the global history of east-west relations. “In 
contrast to our tradition which posits European (i.e. Western) superiority,” as Katharine Diehl 
comments in her review of Asia in the Making of Europe, “Lach reversed the question” (Diehl 1979: 
200).8 That is indeed the value of Donald Lach’s work, to which we should still pay our attention 
and our respect today. As a distinguished professor of history at the University of Chicago, Lach was 
an inspiring scholar to challenge the received notions that continue to dominate views of Asia in the 
western academic as well as journalistic discourses.  
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 More recently, David Porter, Edward Slingerland, and Timothy Brook have all challenged 
the received notions about China and the west. With a remarkable ability to unravel the mystery of 
Johannes Vermeer’s paintings down to their fascinating details and to unfold the whole seventeen-
century east-west encounters as background of the rich colors of Vermeer’s Dutch interiors, Brook 
leads us to enter Vermeer’s paintings as gateways into an enchanting world, in which, he tells us, 
“people were weaving a web of connections and exchanges as never before” (Brook 2009: 6).9 Since 
Marco Polo, Brooks argues, the “quest to get to China was a relentless force that did much to shape 
the history of the seventeenth century, not just within Europe and China, but in most of the places 
in between.” In such a historical perspective, China becomes the inevitable focus. “The lure of 
China’s wealth haunted the seventeenth-century world” (Brook 2009: 19). To make the claim that 
China played a pivotal role in shaping the global history of the seventeenth-century is certainly a new 
and bold assertion, which was probably impossible to make fifty years ago, but Brook’s claim is 
supported by meticulous research, historical and textual evidence, and a persuasive argument that 
shows, again like Lach’s or Reichwein’s works, how important it is to recognize the interconnections 
and mutual influence of Asia and Europe so as to better understand the world both in its past 
history and at the present time.  
 Martin Powers’ new book further strengthens this line of argument that challenges the 
misleading stereotypes of east-west cultural differences and dichotomies based on ethnocentric and 
nationalistic biases and opens up possibilities of new perspectives and new horizons to understand 
China and Europe in much more constructive and fruitful ways. Given the social and political 
situations in the world today, this is extremely important not just for its significant contribution to 
scholarship, but for its relevance to the living experience we have in our daily existence. We need 
more of such rational voices in rethinking and reconceptualizing many of our basic notions and 
ideas about the world, and that is the great value of Powers’ book and its respectable predecessors.  
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Short Introduction to China and England: The Preindustr ia l  Strugg le  
 for  Just i ce  in Word and Image:  Its Aims, Content, and Context 
 
MARTIN POWERS 
University of Michigan, USA (mpow@umich.edu) 
 
 
This book is about China’s forgotten role in the history of social justice debate in England during 
the eighteenth century. To provide context for the book, we might inquire why China’s role was 
forgotten. John Stewart’s book, entitled America: Teacher’s Edition, unexpectedly provides a clue. The 
book is a humorous but insightful parody of the misinformation one finds in western civilization 
textbooks. On page 4 we encounter a “Timeline of Democracy” beginning with Stonehenge. When 
we get to the eigth and ninth centuries we read: “Chinese develop gunpowder, banking, newspapers, 
advanced medicine, paper money. Not Western; doesn’t count.” If you laughed—and you were 
supposed to—it means you got the joke. Stewart took it for granted that the nationalist bias in 
western civilization textbooks was well known to his readers and so they would get the joke. But 
supposing our textbooks do credit the west with other people’s discoveries, does it matter?  
 I believe it does, not merely because the standard narrative is biased or unfair. For a 
historian, the real problem is that, if we remove the non-European world—and especially China—
from the record of modern social development, we cannot fully grasp the dynamics of that 
development, because the sample is just too small and the record patched with misinformation. This 
was one concern when writing this book. In addition, suppressing the history of social justice debate 
in China deprives citizens today of valuable resources for rethinking and defending the idea of social 
justice at a moment when those values we call “liberal” suffer attacks at home and around the world.  
 In the United States, a potent threat to liberal values comes from White Nationalism, 
whether in the countryside or, more recently, even in the halls of government. Bearing that in mind, 
it is worth noting that the standard Western History narrative differs little from White Nationalist 
slogans about western civilization. These, in turn, echo closely the claims found in western 
civilization surveys. Widely assigned texts by historians such as Eric Jones, John Hall, or Jared 
Diamond compare the west with other civilizations, repeatedly claiming that individualism, human 
rights, imagination, and just about anything noble and good is unique to the west. The distinguished 
Cambridge anthropologist Jack Goody (1919-2015) spent much of his career debunking these 
claims, arguing that the so-called “European Miracle” in fact was a “Eurasian Miracle,” with the 
“Asia” part having been carefully excised (Goody 1996; 2006; 2010).1 J.M. Blaut (1927-2000), in 
Eight Eurocentric Historians, examined in conscientious detail the evidence and arguments proposed by 
Jones, Diamond, and six others. His analysis reveals how their arguments imply that historical 
change is brought about by ethnic character rather than individual initiative (Blaut 2010: 1, 73-112).2 
He showed that most of them made use of the same specious arguments and displayed shocking 
ignorance of Asia, citing folk myth as if it were fact. The claims of White Nationalists tally well with 
these works.  
 Such claims have consequences for the rest of us. Following the 2016 elections and the rise 
of populist movements around the globe, we have seen a spate of books and articles on the failure 
of liberalism (e.g., Deneen 2018).3 While many of these works describe current challenges 
compellingly, most share the view that liberal values are unique to the west.  
 If equality under the law, systemic checks on power, or religious choice really were unique to 
the west, then the Huntington thesis, with its dark visions of global conflict, would be difficult to 
refute, and that would be a dangerous thing for all of us. But what if many of those values are not 
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unique, not because we would like it to be so, but because that is what the historical record tells us? 
In that case, the prospects for an egalitarian, rule-of-law style of government beyond America and 
Western Europe, or even within, might improve. Rather than being viewed as noble but outmoded, 
ideals such as equality, checks, privacy, or reality-based policy could be seen as aspirations that have 
arisen unevenly but repeatedly in human history. Such a view would seriously undermine White 
Nationalist talking points, but it would require those who personally identify with “Western 
Civilization” to abandon claims for uniqueness in matters of social justice.  
 China and England argued that some aspirations that arose in Europe in the early modern 
period were responses to conditions commonly found around the world. Progressive responses to 
these conditions, then, are likely to arise in some form and in varying degrees in multiple times and 
places—not in all times and places. These shared challenges include: 
 
 • The abuse of power by privileged incompetents to the detriment of the nation and society. 
 • The abuse of religion to maintain the privilege system and deceive the people. 
 • The unequal and arbitrary application of the law based on class privilege rather than facts.  
 • The abuse of taxpayer money by “public” agents for private purposes. 
 
In China, these conditions not only were identified as problematic, they were theorized, and 
institutional remedies were suggested and tested (Powers 2019, chapters 3, 4, 5, 7, 9). The book also 
identified multiple cases in which theory developed for a specific problem in England could be 
compared with those developed in China. For example, Hobbes recognized that the multitude is 
diverse in its views and regarded this as a possible threat to state policy, which must be focused. His 
solution was to subordinate the disparate wills of the multitude to the single will of the sovereign 
(Allen 2004: 78).4 Bai Juyi (772-846) noticed a similar problem: in a policy document on law he 
wrote, “one person, one point of view, ten-thousand persons, ten-thousand points of view,” how to 
unite them? With law, he said, but not by subordinating everyone’s will to the monarch’s will. On 
the contrary, the laws must be executed equally irrespective of wealth, lineage, or connections of 
friendship (Powers 2019: 54). By Song times, the disparate political views of the multitude were 
treated as a crucial element in society, and had acquired a name: “public opinion 公议、公论.” Formal 
channels were created for its expression, and the term appears commonly in policy documents.  
 It is worth noting that both men recognized a similar challenge for centralizing polities. This 
convergence was not due to influence, much less to national genius. The book posits that the 
problem of the center and the multitude is structural—it is a problem that centralizing governments 
often need to address—and so is likely to arise in multiple, advanced political systems.  
 With regard to the liberal values problem, note that this comparison does not conform to 
the stereotype. We would expect that the Chinese writer would demand that everyone should 
conform to the king’s will, and we would expect that the western thinker would uphold equality and 
the rule of law. Does this show that westerners are authoritarian and Chinese democratic? Of course 
not. What it does show is that the ideas and policies supporting one or the other are not the product 
of anyone’s Volksgeist. We cannot presume to predict the nature of imperial China’s political theories 
or practices on the basis of folk myth and racial stereotypes.  
 The book examines many other convergences. For example, for the Free Thinkers and other 
reformers of the early eighteenth century, one response to the arbitrary excesses of aristocracy was 
to promote meritocratic standards in the appointment of “places,” their term for an “office.” In 
China, of course, a rigorous meritocratic system, including anonymous civil service examinations, 
had been in place since the eleventh century. In this instance, the similarities are not due entirely to 
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structural constraints, for the Free Thinkers and other English reformers were familiar with Chinese 
institutions and openly promoted their adoption in England (90-6, 129-33).  
 Parallels such as these open the door to a more expanded comparative analysis that could 
yield greater insight into how societies inhibit the development of oligarchy, or how more egalitarian 
systems devolve into oligarchy, but conducting a comparison is difficult to accomplish. The reason 
is that often historians prefer to compare civilizations rather than specific policies and practices. The 
problem with that is such comparisons can continue on ad infinitum yet accomplish nothing because 
civilizations are too variable, and too internally diverse, to be compared. 
 Throughout the book, China and England made use of translingual analysis to establish a 
more focused basis for comparison. It examined a body of translations from exemplary edicts and 
policy documents assembled in China between the twelfth and seventeenth centuries. These 
documents promoted ideals such as meritocracy, public opinion, free criticism of the government, 
and other values we typically associate with “western” liberalism. The Jesuits translated these into 
French from the late seventeenth through early eighteenth centuries, and these then were translated 
into English by the 1730s. Samuel Johnson (1709-1784) wrote a glowing book review with the result 
that they were widely read, yet this body of literature, and the accuracy of the translations, have 
received little attention by historians of the Enlightenment.  
 The book not only considers the accuracy of the translations, but applies translingual analysis 
to determine how English intellectuals understood or misunderstood Chinese political practices. For 
example, in the late imperial administration, an officer’s authority resided in the office/zhi, not in 
social status or wealth. That is why officers could be promoted, demoted, or dismissed by the 
Ministry of Personnel. In seventeenth-century Europe, however, authority normatively was a 
function of social status. For this reason, writers from Samuel von Pufendorf (1632-1694), a 
precursor of the German Enlightenment, to the radical publicist Abbe Raynal (1713-1796) chose to 
express the powers of office in China as “nobility,” a term that fails to distinguish between social 
status and the authority of office (chapter 8). Nonetheless, roughly a century after these ideas were 
introduced, we find that Paine and Jefferson had fully grasped their logic.  
 The book does not ascribe this process to “influence,” as this presumes the existence of 
cultural essences. The core argument is that progressive intellectuals in both China and England 
faced similar challenges, and so English radicals were able to make effective use of translations from 
Chinese policy documents for their own purposes. These adaptations could occur because the abuse 
of power by the privileged, like the abuse of office for private purposes, is a perennial challenge that 
arises now and again across the globe and throughout time. Such abuses remain challenges to this 
day, which is why it is worthwhile to examine these phenomena as something other than the unique 
products of national character.  
 
 
1 Prefatory Remarks 
 
I would like first to express my gratitude to all the discussants, not only for exposing issues of 
concern for comparative political theory, but for their challenging comments which frequently 
provide an opportunity to discuss in greater detail topics that were not fully addressed. I have read 
essays by all the discussants and feel honored to receive guidance from such outstanding scholars. 
Useful comments are more numerous than can be addressed here, so I have selected those topics 
that seem most productive in terms of human rights issues. 
 Before addressing the discussants individually, it might save time to address matters raised in 
more than one set of comments.  
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 1. The first matter is that the book is sometimes treated as if it were a civilizational 
comparison. This requires us to recognize that China and England inserts itself into a body of 
literature that, typically, takes that form. All eight historians Blaut discussed adopted this mode, and 
one could add to the list John King Fairbank’s writings (e.g., Fairbank 1968)5 along with others 
working in his shadow. Because of this, it would be natural to think of China and England as yet 
another in this genre, but it is not. In the introduction and conclusion, the book rejects the value of 
such an enterprise. Rather than compare civilizations, the book is interested in comparing policies 
and institutions for insight into perennial social challenges. To accomplish this, it examines how 
China’s policy documents, social practices, and institutions were translated, interpreted, and adapted 
by English writers during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.  
 The book differs from civilizational comparisons in that no claim is made regarding the 
uniqueness of Chinese political theory or practice across time. If a discourse of equality or political 
speech evolved in at least two places, this shows that it could have evolved anywhere given the right 
conditions. The introduction suggests, in fact, that further research into other cultural traditions 
should turn up a rich body of material on social justice. Although the book states multiple times that 
the emergence of progressive ideas in China was not unique and cannot be attributed to national 
character (39, 50, 89, 124-25, 126, 214, and the entire last chapter), judging from the comments, this 
point could have been pressed more often, or more insistently. 
 Another feature of civilizational comparison is the tendency to confuse the part with the 
whole, because the underlying premise of such a comparison is that civilizations retain an essential 
character throughout time. As Blaut demonstrated in the chapter cited above, the umbrella concept 
of “the west” allows historians to attribute nineteenth-century developments to the fifteenth century 
by assuming that such practices must have existed in embryonic form from early times. Blaut called 
this “telescoping.” On the other side, Cold War warriors liked to cite arcane practices from pre-
imperial times, then write as if those practices were maintained throughout all of Chinese history, 
despite hard evidence to the contrary. This could be seen as another form of telescoping. 
 China and England preferred to compare policies and institutions, as well as discursive habits 
such as reliance on facts, since many of these were shared across cultural boundaries. Such evidence 
can undermine pan-historical claims about “western” values by exposing the fact that the latter are 
not unique and may appear late in historical time. Even so, the book does not deny that progressive 
ideals appeared periodically in Europe, as in China and elsewhere (see comments on “virtue politics” 
below). 
 Having recognized that discourses about equality or critical speech appear over time and 
across the globe, China and England is not obliged to document all the instances in which such 
concerns may have been expressed in European history. The book acknowledges that some notions 
of meritocracy, for instance, appeared in England and in Europe in the early modern period. It is 
sufficient to acknowledge this. It is not my burden to add to that literature which is well represented 
in every library in the country. 
 Even so, three of four discussants felt the China case was sometimes overstated. Professor 
Flynn may be right, for instance, that the term “social justice warriors” does not appreciably advance 
the argument. Some of the core arguments, moreover, are stated repeatedly and not always with 
equal nuance. If there be any defense for that, it might be that when one is in a noisy room, one 
needs to speak loudly. Still, my discussants are within their rights to call me out on that, and I thank 
them for suggesting ways to improve the argument in future work. 
 2. The other matter that multiple discussants raised is the use of broad, analytical categories, 
in particular “privilege” systems versus “meritocratic” systems, both of these building on Charles 
Tilly’s work. Some felt that these categories are too crude to apply across time and space, or that 
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their heuristic value is unclear. Since these categories are important for the book’s argument, I am 
happy to discuss the matter further here.  
 In principle, such an objection could apply to any analysis that takes as its focus a higher 
level of abstraction. For instance, if one wanted to understand how animals adapted to a dry land 
environment, where water provided no support for body weight, one might notice that most animals 
have adopted one of two strategies: endoskeletons or exoskeletons. There are few other possibilities. 
Of course, one can think of exceptions (slugs, slime molds), but these severely limit the size and 
mobility of the organism. So, what’s the payoff? By taking the analysis to this level, one would come 
to understand that the choice of support systems both limits and enables many aspects of the 
animal’s adaptive capacity, and that the adaptations arthropods or vertebrates made were to a degree 
path-dependent on their skeletal strategy.  
 Following this line of reasoning, the book assumes that the historical prevalence of 
inequality can inspire resistance in many societies, which then may lead to calls for remedies, and 
these can include meritocratic arguments or other arguments for greater equality. Charles Tilly 
devoted his life to the study of inequality and developed many useful concepts—such as “repertoire 
of contention”—for analyzing the ways in which people in different times and places have pushed 
back against inequality over time (Tilly 1983; 2000; 2003).6 He argued in fact that some social 
systems structurally favor inequality, while meritocracy can ameliorate the condition to varying 
degrees. Between these two asymptotic limits, a wide range of social and institutional practices can 
be devised.  
 The book provides multiple examples of such adaptations, including anonymous civil service 
examinations, the right to appeal judicial decisions, Grievance Offices, a progressive tax system, and 
so on. Some of these strategies, such as judicial appeal and progressive tax systems, arose in Europe 
or America as well. Along the same lines, the book shows how the Free Thinkers, “Cato,” John 
Wilkes, Thomas Jefferson—all of them bent on pursuing some form of legal equality—adapted to 
their situation some policies, principles, and arguments found in translated Chinese documents. The 
book rejects “influence” as a useful explanation, preferring to stress the common struggle against 
privilege. A third option would be to chalk it all up as serendipity, but this would likely violate 
Occam’s Razor.  
 Of course, the objections might not be to the use of broad categories generally, but to the 
way such categories were applied in the book. Here I should confess that my understanding of these 
categories builds on a long history of social theory, east and west, which it might be instructive to 
review, though the list is by no means exhaustive: 
 
 • Confucius divided political systems into two types: humane and inhumane. These 
categories did not address political structure, only what was at stake in styles of 
government.  
 • Mencius accepted these categories, but defined inhumane as “tyrannical,” and the latter as 
the “unequal” application of the laws. This criterion was adopted in Han period law.  
 • Aristotle distinguished between different political systems such as royalty, aristocracy, and 
polity, as well as deviations from these like tyranny and democracy. Anticipating later 
European thinkers, he regarded hereditary class divisions as natural, so meritocratic 
systems do not appear on his list.  
 • Wei Hong, writing during the first century CE, recognized that the system of hereditary 
status was first abolished when the Qin dynasty (221-206 BCE) established the junxian 
system, or administration by salaried offices based on merit.  
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 • In the ninth century, Liu Zongyuan (773-819) further theorized the distinction between 
the hereditary feudal, or fengjian system, and the junxian, or salaried system. His analysis was 
structural in that it focused on institutions and policies, sinecures versus offices, but there 
was a moral dimension as well based on his egalitarian conception of social justice (52-3).  
 • Shen Kuo (1031-1095) distinguished between aristocracy, in which political authority is 
confined to a hereditary nobility, and a meritocratic system, in which political authority is 
assigned according to individual learning and ability (59-60).  
 • By the time Montesquieu wrote, the details of China’s meritocratic system—including 
institutional checks, service to the people as the standard of legitimate government, and 
the need for popular feedback—had been widely discussed by progressives for decades. 
He drew upon Greek and Roman thinkers as well as the Du Halde volumes to construct 
his familiar breakdown of political systems, but he largely rejected meritocracy (179-182).  
 • Thomas Paine (1737-1809) distinguished between aristocratic “titles” or arbitrary 
authority, and “offices,” in which the officer is qualified to execute the requirements of 
office. Paine’s distinction is informed by moral criteria—arbitrary authority is bad—but 
shares with bureaucratic theory the distinction between merit and privilege (216-217).  
 • S.N. Eisenstadt (1923-2010) distinguished between feudal/patrimonial societies and 
bureaucratic systems of government. The latter are characterized by a distinction between 
public and private, merit as the criterion for office, independent spheres of authority in 
office, and other features that he associated with more “modern” governments (Eisenstadt 
1969: 22-4).7  
 • Benedict Anderson distinguished between “self-consciously,” which is to say, individually 
held political ideologies, and ideologies rooted in religion and the “dynastic realm.” Both 
religion and the dynastic realm are based on membership in hereditary religious, ethnic, or 
status groups, in contrast to memberships determined by individuals according to their 
own personal criteria (Anderson 1983).8  
 • Charles Tilly (1929-2008) distinguished between “inequality-generating systems” and 
“sorting systems” as explained in the book. The former take groups as their focus, and the 
latter, individuals (Tilly 2003).  
 
One might have mentioned Sir Henry Maine, Karl Marx, Max Weber, Marc Bloch, and any number 
of other theorists, but you get the idea. All these systems—mostly binary—could be described as 
overly generalized, and yet (1) noteworthy thinkers across the globe found them to be useful, and (2) 
the internal resemblances among them are too close to be dismissed as serendipity. While not a 
member of the noteworthy club, I find several of these analytical binaries useful as follows:  
 
 (1) From the standpoint of social justice issues, they identify what is at stake in the 
underlying structures of political systems. Assigning authority on the basis of 
hereditary group membership detaches power from expertise and accountability. This 
encourages arbitrary government, which was recognized east and west as tyranny.  
 (2) They help to identify the different types of logic internal to different political systems. 
A meritocratic system must apply the same criteria to every candidate for a job or it 
will fail to select the best candidate. This means group membership must be excluded 
as much as possible. That is what is meant by “egalitarian.” A privilege system, on the 
other hand, operates to enhance privilege for high-ranking groups and punish low-
ranking groups. There is no other purpose to fulfill, such as an office’s charge, and so 
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rigorous formal checks either are not required or are not enforced. By exposing the 
kinds of logic internal to these two ways of imagining authority, these categories reveal 
path-dependencies that encourage fundamentally different kinds of institutional 
development (Powers 2019: 222-28).  
 (3) Unlike “national character,” which never changes, real societies are not static, and so at 
any given time, most will be moving either toward the privilege end of the spectrum or 
toward the meritocratic end, and the direction can change. By making it easier to 
identify the direction of development, these categories can help to detect whether a 
society is moving toward rational governance focused on individuals or arbitrary, 
group-based privilege.  
 
For example, when English intellectuals began to treat nepotism as corruption rather than accepting 
it as a privilege of rank, they challenged a core principle informing England’s aristocracy, namely, 
blood-based privilege. Alternatively, when a public servant in a traditionally rational system can 
openly use office for private benefit without censure or consequence, this is evidence that what had 
been a rational system is morphing into a privilege system. Should a nation find itself in that 
situation, alarm bells should be going off.  
 In regard to the larger theory, or “framing argument” as Professor Flynn usefully puts it, 
Professor Macedo noted that “group membership” is not a very good term. I agree. “Group,” in this 
context, referred to traditional groups based on religion, ethnicity, social status, or wealth, such as 
Benedict Anderson associated with traditional societies and Tilly associated with “inequality-
generating systems.” Still, I am not happy with the term and would welcome suggestions. 
 
 
2 Professor Zhang Longxi 
 
Professor Zhang was generous in his comments. His own work in leveling the playing field has been 
an inspiration for the entire field of Chinese studies. He offered a variety of supporting materials 
that do not appear in the book, beginning with this passage from Mencius: 
 
In a state, the people are the most important element; the dynasty is secondary to that; the 
monarch is the least important.  
 
In view of the norm in other preindustrial societies, it is surprising that Mencius should place the 
monarch below the people in his list of priorities. This view informs later political theory, where “all 
should be in the service of the people” appears in examination prep materials (56). 
 He also referred to the stereotype, common in social psychology circles, that the Chinese 
people have always been collectivist and would never question the authorities. As a counter-example 
he cited a remarkable poem by Tao Hongjing in which the poet adopted an openly defiant tone 
toward the monarch. Though a fine example, it is by no means unusual. Consider the case of Fan 
Ying, who died shortly before organized student demonstrations against the government began to 
appear in China. Emperor Shun (reigned 125-144) repeatedly invited the celebrated scholar to give 
up reclusion and take office, but he refused. Finally, the emperor had him hauled into court and 
upbraided for insolence. Fan replied: “In my eyes, a tyrannical lord is no different from an enemy. If 
I stand in his court against my will, how does that make me noble? If it were not appropriate, even if 
you offered me the highest salary, I would not accept. If will is free to extend where it may, I do not 
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at all resent subsisting on the poorest meal. So how can your majesty make me wealthy? How can 
you make me poor?” (Fan 2723; DeWoskin 1982: 198).9 
 The basis for Fan’s argument can be traced to Mencius, so it shouldn’t surprise anyone, yet it 
runs directly counter to the stereotype. Asserting the individual’s moral autonomy in fact is central 
to both the Confucian and the Daoist traditions. Moreover, in late imperial China, power and 
punishment normatively were distributed on the basis of individual actions, not social status.  
 Translingual analysis shows what happens when a text that takes individuals as primary is 
translated by persons accustomed to group-based norms. Among the Chinese policy documents that 
were translated in the eighteenth century, many presumed that the people’s welfare was more 
important than majesty, and so contained defiant language addressed to the monarch. Time and 
again, European translators toned down the language to make it more courteous, or to stress the 
monarch’s majesty where the Chinese original did not. This is precisely the opposite of what one 
would expect if the stereotypes propagated in social science classrooms were true.  
 He also helpfully reviewed earlier attempts to reveal the hybrid character of what we now 
call the “west,” citing writers such as Reichwein, Lach, Lovejoy, and more recent authors such as 
Timothy Brook. The more recent authors were mentioned, but the book could have done more to 
review this genre of historical writing. Thanks to Longxi for the help. 
 
 
3 Professor Sandra Field 
 
Professor Field’s summary is generous and insightful, and adds conceptual clarity to some of the 
book’s core arguments. Her outline of key points is especially helpful. She articulates concisely—and 
more effectively in some ways than the book—why visual images are important for the history of 
social thought. At the same time, she has given me the opportunity to clarify some matters that likely 
would catch the attention of many readers. Her comments are among the most challenging of the 
lot, but for this reason they have been especially productive.  
 I would like to begin with meritocracy and hierarchy. During the panel discussion, Professor 
Field remarked that meritocracy in fact is hierarchical. In her comments, moreover, she maintained 
that imperial China was both meritocratic and hierarchical, and found this problematic. The concept 
of meritocracy is central to the book, so I am grateful to her for raising this matter. Indeed, in recent 
years the value of meritocracy has been widely questioned in the media (e.g., The Economist 2006).10 
This may derive from the fact that (1) Americans think of themselves as meritocratic, yet extreme 
inequality is rampant, and (2) meritocracy is easily mapped onto Social-Darwinian theories of 
distributive justice. As a result, the media may imply that the super-wealthy deserve to be influential 
because, well, they earned it! But if this were so, then mob bosses also should be labeled meritorious, 
and so some on the left have declared that meritocracy breeds extreme inequality. All this ignores a 
long history of meritocratic theory. The fact is that, in China and in Europe, those who originally 
promoted meritocratic administration explicitly excluded wealth as a criterion for merit.  
 In China, Mozi (fifth century BCE) excluded wealth and lineage in consideration for office. 
By Han times (second century BCE to early third century CE), ethnicity had joined the list, and by 
Song times, anonymous civil service examinations excluded religion, ethnicity, wealth, lineage, and 
most other kinds of group membership from consideration (Powers 2019, chapters 4 and 7). The 
exams were testing for talent and learning (cai) and dedication to public welfare (de). These terms are 
not uncommon in Chinese documents rendered into English in the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, where they were translated variously as genius/talent/ wisdom and “virtue.” In England, 
Richard Steele recognized that the decline in “virtue” among Englishmen “may be attributed to the 
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folly of admitting wit and learning as merit in themselves, without considering the application of 
them.” He notes that, though wealth was understood as a token of merit, wealthy men often made 
their money at public expense and so were not meritorious at all. By mid-century, Rousseau (1712-
1778) recognized talent (or genius) and virtue as necessary qualities for public office. In his Bill for the 
More General Diffusion of Knowledge (1778), Jefferson identified those same qualities as requisite for any 
man who would serve the American people (Powers 2019, chapter 8). However, like Mozi, he 
excluded any consideration of “wealth or parentage.”  
 Charles Tilly did not deny that meritocratic selection typically results in a hierarchy, such as 
when football players are ranked according to ability. At the same time, he suggested that sorting by 
talent or ability still may be preferable to the alternatives, such as patronage, quotas, assignment by 
social class, seniority, or random selection. The problem, in other words, is not hierarchy but the 
criteria by which it is constructed, yet few have recognized this distinction. John King Fairbank even 
took advantage of this equivocation so as to conflate China’s meritocratic hierarchy with Europe’s 
aristocratic hierarchy, but he failed to mention that all universities, corporations, NGOs, or church 
groups with officers are hierarchical. One should not confuse these hierarchies with hereditary 
European aristocracies or modern oligarchies.  
 As S.N. Eisenstadt explained, in hereditary-ranked societies, the social hierarchy is roughly 
parallel to the political hierarchy, and wealth levels match one’s place in those hierarchies. In a 
meritocracy, wealth, social status, and political authority typically function independently (Eisenstadt 
1969: 22-4). In Song China, a magistrate could wield political authority, but his pay was typically low, 
while a merchant might be wealthy but could not exercise political authority except through 
methods officially deemed “corrupt.” This situation is much closer to that of the “modern west” 
than it is to pre-twentieth-century European aristocracies, where status, wealth, and political power 
were roughly parallel. 
 Professor Field’s observations about the cognitive thesis are compelling. I persuaded myself 
to go with it for the following reasons: 1. Social psychology research shows that group membership, 
especially if based on visual features, is cognitively easy to grasp, and many pre-industrial societies 
categorized society according to visible differences in group membership, including race, religion, 
gender, and wealth level. 2. Social psychology research also shows that poorly educated persons in 
the U.S. tend to gravitate toward ideologies that map onto visible ethnic, racial, religious, or gender 
differences. 3. Both China and England appear to follow an evolution in the use of visual tropes, 
roughly from allegory to reportage, and the later tropes appear to demand higher levels of cognitive 
operation than the earlier ones. 4. It seems reasonable to suppose that educational levels will be 
higher, on average, in societies where the central government funds a basic educational system. This 
was the case in Han times, when social mobility was quite high and the weight of group membership 
reduced. That system fell apart during the medieval period, to be replaced with schools run by the 
Buddhist Church, which was supported by the aristocracy. Meritocracy collapsed and ranked groups 
arose again, with artistic production focused mainly on the Church and the nobility. All this would 
help to explain why group-based systems are more common in history than meritocratic ones. 
Having said that, this idea remains an intriguing hypothesis that explains some things but—as 
Professor Field observes—not others. I’m convinced that the hypothesis requires more refinement, 
and Professor Field has provided important clues as to how to proceed. 
 I feel that Professor Field overstates my claims at other moments in her argument: 1. that 
evolution from group-based to sorting systems is inevitable; 2. that China did it first; and  3. that the 
book doesn’t pay sufficient attention to European ideas that might resemble those the English 
noticed in Chinese texts.  
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 1. The first concern has been addressed in the prefatory comments, but I will add a note 
here. Although Professor Field cites specific page numbers for that claim, if one checks those pages, 
what one generally finds is “X can emerge” or “X could arise” and so on, not “X will inevitably lead to 
Y” (e.g., Powers 2019: 8-9).  
 2. “Powers claims that the Chinese first came up with the various political ideals. . .” which 
she again follows with specific page numbers (Field 2020: 190). If one examines those pages, one 
will find a more nuanced argument based on translingual analysis. Such analysis frequently shows 
that concepts we now regard as western were treated as novel in translations published in the late 
seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. The book does not stress whether a concept appeared 
first in China, even if that appears to be the case, nor does it say that concept X never appeared in 
European thought earlier than the seventeenth century. Instead it shows that Europeans and 
Englishmen who encountered core political ideas in Chinese texts treated them as novel. This is 
difficult to deny.  
 We also find that the Europeans who responded to the Chinese texts do not appear to have 
been familiar with those putative early European sources. For instance, on page 92 Johan Nieuhof is 
cited and I note that “already in this passage ‘the people’ acquires a complexion uncommon (not 
unknown) in seventeenth-century English writing.” Earlier chapters had shown that, prior to the 
eighteenth century, “people” more often was understood as a multitude “to be ruled.” The 
succeeding pages show that Mencian talking points, such as the necessity of gaining “the hearts and 
minds of the people,” or the purpose of government as the “happiness of the people,” were 
mentioned repeatedly in translations of Chinese texts appearing from the seventeenth century 
onward. Then the book cites the preface to the Brooks edition of the Du Halde translation (1736), 
dedicated to Frederick, Prince of Wales, to show that those very notions were being introduced by 
the translators as novel and laudable. If the book were making a civilizational comparison, it would 
have argued that “China did it first,” for that is what such comparisons do, but even if specific 
political ideas seemed to appear earlier in China, the book did not treat that fact as especially 
interesting. It was the English response that was interesting. 
 3. “[The book] also makes implausible claims that the distinction between the benefit of the 
ruler/ruling class and the benefit of the whole of society was unknown in England” (Field 2020: 
190). I’m not certain the book makes that claim, although a passage from Thomas More does, and 
Professor Field cited the page where More’s criticism of the English system was quoted. In citing 
him, the book recognized that some Englishmen—More, for instance—did indeed make the 
distinction between benefit to the ruling group and benefit to the people, but from other texts it 
would appear that the interests of the aristocracy often were conflated with the “Commonwealth,” 
as More observed. The book also used translingual analysis to show that seventeenth-century 
Europeans and Englishmen had difficulty understanding authority as anything other than social rank 
and privilege. Such an understanding, whether in China or England, contributes little to the benefit 
of commoners.  
 In relation to this topic, Professor Field mentioned Aristotle’s critiques of bad government, 
but there are at least three good reasons why I did not go into Aristotle: 1. he was not a seventeenth- 
or eighteenth-century English writer interested in Chinese texts; 2. the book is not a civilizational 
comparison; and 3. if it were, Aristotle would not compare well with Mencius. Aristotle had a 
concept of bad government, but he also thought class privilege was perfectly natural. Mencius and 
his Han and Song followers gave to ordinary farmers many rights that Aristotle would not have 
given them. I do not doubt that better examples than Aristotle could be found, but that is precisely 
what the book suggests one would find. I have no objection to properly rigorous examples of social 
justice arguments outside of China and Enlightenment England, but it is not my job to list them all.  
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 Although Professor Field cites four instances in which the book acknowledges that the 
China discoveries likely are not unique, she goes on to remark that “the book gives only passing 
mention to these radical ideas (50, 128, 136), and on the whole the book reduces English political 
consciousness to the early modern absolutism of King James and Thomas Hobbes” (Field 2020: 
190). As explained above, I am not comparing civilizations, but why spend more time on James I 
and Hobbes? The book notes that, despite the fact that early modern China and England shared 
several technologies and social practices, English radicals tended to emphasize the differences 
between the two. I was obliged to explain this. To do so, it would not help to cite some ancient 
author. Instead I made note of mainstream concepts of sovereignty in England such as those 
articulated by James I and Hobbes, noting that Hobbes’ view of society was influential but was not 
the only one (50). Given further that the theories of some liberal thinkers in England, such as Locke 
or Hume, were driven in part by concerns over Hobbes’ more draconian claims, it is reasonable to 
suppose that eighteenth-century English radicals shared such concerns, so it became necessary to 
discuss Hobbes. Finally, the book was concerned with visualizations of political concepts, and the 
frontispiece to Leviathan is among the most discussed examples of that genre.  
 This line of argument culminates in another interesting idea: “Powers’ discussion of social 
justice relies on an underlying presumption: that there is a single master-concept of political justice, 
encompassing all other more specific values and uniting them together; and that all societies tend 
towards recognizing it” (Field 2020: 191). Though I would disagree with that characterization, 
Professor Field’s claim is not without some basis in structuralist historical studies such as were 
conducted by Tilly and his followers, or for that matter, Liu Zongyuan, Marc Bloch, and S.N. 
Eisenstadt. The latter three historians independently concluded that feudal societies are prone to 
violence and instability, and that this is not desirable. Liu and Eisenstadt agreed that matching 
individual talents to particular political tasks fostered a more stable government better able to meet 
economic and political challenges to the benefit of the population. In fact, all the historians listed in 
the prefatory section presumed that any stable government able to benefit the bulk of the 
population was a better government. I would align myself with that group, but do not consider that 
to be Whiggish, because even those historians who adopt the “invisible hand” hypothesis argue that 
it will benefit the larger population. If one were to seek alternatives, one would quickly land in 
Hobbesian territory, arguing that rigid discipline in the service of a tiny minority is preferable to the 
chaos that would surely ensue if the commoners had any rights. So, I can see where Professor Field 
is coming from, but her characterization still strikes me as overstated, perhaps on the assumption 
that the book is a civilizational comparison.  
 One interesting development from this argument is Professor Field’s suggestion that, in the 
end, China departs from the master ideal (benefit to the people?) in significant ways where the west 
does not. For argument’s sake, let’s assume that we accept the following proposition: governments 
that benefit the bulk of the population are more stable and more just in some sense than 
governments that benefit a few and exploit the multitude. This still does not fit Professor Field’s 
notion of a master ideal, because it does not imply that the former type of system will inevitably 
develop out of the latter. The book shows repeatedly that things can go either way; there is no 
“must.”  
 Nonetheless, let’s assume that we have a master ideal of some sort or other. In that case, I 
would treat differences between Enlightenment England and China as a matter of degree, not kind. 
Although sixteenth- and seventeenth-century English writings pay lip service to the 
“Commonwealth,” eighteenth-century radicals were not in the least satisfied by that, and so 
advocated adopting Chinese policies and institutions. Does this mean that they were pursuing the 
exact same practices as could be found in China? No. If anything is inevitable, it is that there will be 
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differences, not only between China and England, but between France and England, America and 
England, and so on. The book’s main contention is that it is not unusual to find development across 
cultural traditions, in which case local differences will multiply along with commonalities. So when, 
by the end of the eighteenth century, English and American radicals had incorporated several ideas 
and policies from translated documents into their own discourse, they adapted such notions to their 
own local challenges. In much the same way, Americans adapted electoral systems and 
representative bodies from the English tradition. Developments in America later had some impact 
on English practice, but the two “democracies” remain very distinct to this day—one, for instance, 
still has a monarch and a House of Lords chosen on the basis of primogeniture, a feudal institution 
outlawed in Song China. Still, both traditions should be seen as part of a common evolution that 
yielded practical benefits to both populations, but in different ways.  
 Consistent with the civilizational line of thought, towards the end of her remarks, Professor 
Field adopts an argument that though post-Tang China may have developed a meritocracy and 
institutions to foster equality, etc., still, China: 1. lacked a concept of rights; 2. accepted a hierarchical 
society; and 3. was fundamentally not individualist. All this calls to mind Cold War claims about 
fundamentally different “cultures” driving historical development. Judging from the character of her 
research on Spinoza, I don’t believe that was her aim—but from here on the narrative begins to 
resemble any number of Fairbankian talking points that I recall from graduate school days: China 
being somehow more “hierarchical,” lacking a genuine concept of rights, being focused on ritual 
self-cultivation, and so on. In fact, the argument here follows Cold War methods, either citing ideas 
found in classical texts as if they applied throughout history (telescoping) or quoting post-Opium 
War writers as evidence that even native Chinese historians agreed about China’s national character. 
Let me discuss these two kinds of evidence separately. 
 The hierarchy argument has been examined above. What about the evidence from classical 
texts? Fairbank’s interpretive system was based on the notion of an essentialized and unchanging 
“culture” as the chief object of analysis in Chinese studies (Farqhuar and Hevia 1993: 494).11 This is 
what permitted him to adopt telescoping as a method. He would find some ultra-conservative 
sentiment in the Book of Rites (ca. fourth century BCE) or in Mencius and then apply that to late 
imperial China as if nothing had changed in the interim. He could do this because he assumed that a 
culture’s national character does not change, and that one can determine national character by 
cherry-picking quotes from the classics.  
 China and England referred to Mencius and other classical texts only when they were 
incorporated into Han or Song legal and cultural practice. We need Mencius to make sense of poems 
and paintings portraying starving villagers, as well as to understand Sima Guang’s arguments for 
policy. Mencius wrote many other things, but if it didn’t get into the Song exemplary documents, I 
did not make use of it for examining those Song period policies that interested English radicals.  
 The works of early twentieth-century Chinese scholars have been used to support the Cold 
War account of Chinese national character. The argument implies, “You see, even the Chinese admit 
it!” But this is a bit like claiming that Clarence Thomas fairly represents the interests of black people 
in America because he’s black. The Opium War shattered the confidence of Chinese intellectuals so 
that May 4th writers often mimic western stereotypes about China’s supposedly defective national 
character. Moreover, they were in no position to compare Imperial Chinese institutions to European 
ones because they knew nothing about the latter except the self-serving myths western missionaries 
fed to them. Nor is it obvious that many of them had any awareness of the late imperial institutions 
reviewed in China and England. When they compared, they often compared civilizations, not policies 
and institutions, and it is common knowledge that they generally thought everything western was 
good and anything Chinese was bad. The appeal for Cold War warriors should be obvious.  
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 Professor Field’s work on European history shows no trace of essentialist assumptions or 
any interest in national character, so my guess is that these assumptions and this evidence seeped 
into her argument from the vast body of secondary literature on China. The only antidote is to turn 
to primary sources interpreted in context.  
 I am grateful that Professors Field and Flynn raise the problem of “individualism” and 
“rights,” as I hope that my book will prompt more discussion of these ideas. It may be that such 
discussion would oblige me to revise some of the book’s claims, but I doubt we can remove these 
rubrics entirely from our understanding of China. First, individualism tends to be defined in vague 
terms. The criteria for “individualism” among the authors Blaut discussed are similar to those we 
find in the Fairbank School. Often, the evidence offered has to do with some nebulous attitude, like 
the spirit of adventure required to travel forth and conquer people in remote corners of the globe. 
Jones even attributed an “individualistic” spirit to medieval European societies ruled by aristocracies, 
societies where commoners could not choose their religion, occupation, community, or even their 
clothing (Blaut 2010: 84, 91). I don’t see how such vague criteria can tell us anything about history. 
However, if we review the evidence offered in China and England, yet retain the assumption that 
westerners were individualistic while Chinese were not, we end up with some very odd 
contradictions: 
 
• Europeans were individualistic, yet could not understand political authority apart from 
social status before a significant infusion of Chinese texts into left-wing discourse.  
• Europeans were individualistic, yet resisted giving political authority to commoners on the 
basis of their individual talents, industry, and learning.  
• Europeans were individualistic, yet court cases typically were decided on the basis of group 
membership rather than the individual actions of the parties involved (Conley 1991).  
• People in China were not individualistic, yet group membership was significantly reduced 
(not eliminated) in law, in the arts, and in the assignment of government offices.  
• People in China were not individualistic, yet artists began to rebuff the demands of the 
nobility by the ninth century. Bohemian artists appear about the same time, and by the 
mid-eleventh century, the court had lost cultural hegemony in all the major media to 
private intellectuals. In individualistic Europe these same phenomena occurred, but not 
until the late eighteenth or nineteenth centuries.  
 
We could form a similar list for rights: 
 
• Europeans had a concept of rights and the Chinese didn’t, yet in China any farm woman 
could bring a suit to the magistrate’s court or appeal her case. In England, a woman’s 
husband had to represent her, and he might not have that right either.  
• Europeans had a concept of rights and the Chinese didn’t, but people in China had the 
right to complain to government offices on any aspect of policy, corruption, the 
qualifications of officers, and so on. In England, generally speaking, commoners could not 
do this.  
• Europeans had a concept of rights and the Chinese didn’t, yet European commoners did 
not have any right to compete for offices unless such were granted to them as “favors” by 
an aristocrat. In China there were no aristocrats and any educated man of almost any race 
or religion could compete for office in anonymous examinations.  
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The contradictions above arise from the intersection of two kinds of criteria: the impressionistic 
variety favored by the authors Blaut examined, and specific institutions and practices adopted in 
China and England at specific times. For this reason, I do not believe that the comparisons just 
listed have any real merit. They still appeal to a civilizational comparison, so let’s put that aside.  
 In the end, the book only says that reformist intellectuals in England and China shared much 
more in common than we formerly supposed. It was my hope that, by pointing to common ground, 
the book might undermine essentialist arguments and enlarge possibilities for fruitful comparison. 
Along those lines, one possibility occurred to me while reading one of Professor Field’s articles on 
Spinoza, which I found to be brilliant. At the outset of her essay, Professor Field says she intends to 
mine the history of political thought for novel conceptual resources for contemporary democratic 
theory. She observes that Spinoza was aware that aristocratic and monarchic rule can lead to popular 
discontent, which then threatens the stability of the polity. This supposition was foundational for 
Chinese political thinkers as well, Mencius included. 
 She shows further that Spinoza was not as egalitarian as some maintain, and that he was 
quite happy to exclude commoners from participation in the polity, but he realized that one must 
prevent resentment from turning into resistance. His solution was to counsel the need to provide 
basic levels of comfort for the masses. To my mind, Spinoza’s insight might provoke thinking on 
how to represent modern citizens who, due to poor education, poverty, or exploitation, do not 
generally participate in the political process.  
 For this problem we can also find resources in the Chinese tradition. In Imperial China, in 
consonance with Spinoza’s views, uneducated taxpayers were supposed to enjoy a decent livelihood, 
but in addition they had the right to assess and complain about state policy or the performance of 
local officials, anonymously if they wished. All taxpayers, moreover, could bring suits to the 
magistrate’s court. They did not need to be wealthy to do so, for the state paid for court expenses. 
Were we to combine Spinoza’s ideas together with this set of institutions, we might construct a 
richer field for finding ways to empower the disempowered in America.  
 
 
4 Professor Jeffrey Flynn 
 
Professor Flynn has been conscientious in his summary and analysis. The distinction he makes 
between core arguments and framing arguments is useful, and he has queried several passages in the 
book that might concern other readers as well. He has articulated these objections in ways that 
prompt me to think and rethink, so his arguments deserve full discussion. One comment I found 
especially productive goes as follows: 
 
Certain structures arise and this automatically gives rise to certain ideas? After reading the 
book, I am not fully clear what specific dynamic gives rise to what he alludes to at various 
points as social resistance (Flynn 2020: 197). 
 
This strikes at a core issue in the book. If certain structural constraints are common in history and 
“automatically” give rise to certain ideas, then those ideas should be found universally, or almost so, 
and that is the basis of the reductio here. I agree that structures are unlikely to automatically give rise 
to certain ideas or practices. The term the book uses is “perennial” challenges—such as systemic 
inequality. Systemic inequality has occurred throughout history east and west, prompting concerns 
on the part of Mencius, Spinoza, and many others about the dangers of rampant poverty and the 
rebellions they inspire. Therefore, we should not be surprised that examples of resistance should be 
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found here and there across time and space, but such responses are perennial, not universal. Given 
that my position is an unfamiliar one, the book could have assigned more space to unpacking that 
idea. Another interesting one: 
 
But if we look at a more radical example of political struggle, like the French Revolution—
something the book takes us right up to the cusp of in its historical analysis—it can be 
understood as an attempt to remake the entire social order on the basis of the equal status of 
rights-holders (Flynn 2020: 198). 
 
This seems to draw upon the Cold War argument that, in China, though dynasties were replaced, the 
fundamental system never changed. This claim always puzzled me, for I should have thought that 
the difference between an aristocratic system and a post-aristocratic system was pretty fundamental. 
That would also be the primary distinction between pre-and-post Revolutionary Europe. Naturally I 
would not deny that the demands for universal rights promoted in Revolutionary France marked a 
new and transformative phase in the struggle against institutionalized privilege. This is certainly true, 
but claims for the universality of liberty were more ambitious in France than in America as well. 
Americans in the U.S. were mainly concerned with their own nation’s liberty. Does this mean that 
American claims for liberty were not truly “western”? The fact is that the differences between 
European nations in the arena of rights can be as great as the differences between imperial China 
and those same nations. We must also recall that the terms and arguments French intellectuals used 
were already infused with discursive mannerisms adapted from Chinese sources, so I’m not certain 
what it would mean to see that development as specifically European?  
 The comment about “equal status of rights-holders” is perceptive, and helps to illustrate the 
value of comparative history. The concept of rights in China indeed evolved differently from the 
way it evolved in Europe. In Europe, “rights” and “liberty” traditionally referred to privileges that 
were attached to inherited status. There were no “universal” rights in England or France prior to the 
eighteenth century. In the book’s introduction I noted that the earliest usage of “common rights” in 
the global sense that I could find is in the preface to the 1738 English edition of Du Halde’s 
Description of China. There the term clearly refers to rights that were recognized in common in China 
and in England. Edward Cave even used the word “common rights,” possibly in a sense novel to the 
west at that time. I was hoping that one or more discussants could point to an earlier, equally 
unambiguous example, as I suspect there must be some, but none were proposed. In any case this 
must be one of the earliest of its kind. When Edward Cave, Wilkes, and others began to extend the 
notion of group-based “rights” in principle to everyone, they removed the group membership 
requirement for holding rights, in effect extending the “privileges” of higher status groups to lower 
status groups. Under those circumstances, the weight of group membership retreated, yielding our 
“modern” notion of “rights” as referring to individuals. The book understands this as a transition 
from a group-focused system to an individual-focused system.  
 In China, the attachment to blood as a determinant of group membership was weak even in 
ancient times, as Shen Kuo recognized in the eleventh century. As a result, in post-aristocratic 
society, legal rights came to be based on one’s taxpayer status, and so were extended to all taxpayers, 
with the weight of group membership drastically reduced. Farm women, as taxpayers, could bring 
suits to the magistrate’s court, or complain to the Grievance Office, or inherit property, whereas 
their European counterparts often could not. In China, it was taxpayer status that was expanded, 
along with taxpayer rights (bianhuqimin) in the post-aristocratic era, rather than the notion of 
inherited privilege.  
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 However, I would note that, both in China and in Europe, the method for promoting 
equality required reducing the weight of group membership. In France and England there was much 
fine rhetoric about equality, but in both countries the governing authority remained in the hands of 
an aristocracy for much of the nineteenth century and beyond. In China, there is little to be 
discerned of an aristocracy after the tenth century, in part because the civil service system radically 
reduced the role of group membership by maintaining anonymity in examinations. Anonymity 
meant that the focus of such examinations was the individual, not the group. Anonymous 
examinations were introduced to England in the late nineteenth century but were firmly resisted by 
the House of Lords because their Graces thought the idea of egalitarian exams was “Chinese” and 
hence ill-suited for British subjects (Teng 1943: 304).  
 To put it into a homely analogy, there are many ways to put out a fire—with water, 
chemicals, or covering flames with blankets—but they all operate the same way, by cutting off 
oxygen from the flames. Likewise, there are historical differences in the way that the pursuit of legal 
equality took place in China and in England, but in both cases, reformers promoted equality by 
reducing the influence of hereditary group membership.  
 Also related is the perfectly valid distinction between “‘rights,’ as things people can claim as 
their rights (in the plural), in contrast with the concept of something being ‘wrong’ (the opposite of 
‘right’ in the singular) in the sense that it violates some moral principle” (Flynn 2020: 198-9). I am 
not certain, however, that this distinction can be mapped onto an east/west binary. Chinese 
taxpayers at all income levels assumed that they had the right to sue, to appeal a case, or to report an 
errant official to the circuit inspector, not to mention the right to choose their own career or their 
own religion, rights denied to many who lived in western countries. In England, through Victorian 
times, it was common for court cases to be determined mainly on the basis of social status (Conley 
1991). But then, this is hardly surprising considering that, in England, most representatives in both 
the upper and lower houses were members of the nobility. In short, I fail to see how a uniquely 
western concept of rights managed to provide western people with more practicable rights.  
 “Particular conceptions of human rights really are the outcome of particular moments in 
history […]” (Flynn 2020: 200). Indeed, but if one took this to its logical conclusion, no comparative 
historical study would be possible. Surely “western” is too vague to justify comparison between, say, 
banking practices in Renaissance Italy and banking practices in the U.S. today—unless one argued 
that there is a historical link, with the designers of the American banking system building on earlier, 
European banking practices that, in turn, had their Italian precedents? But if we allow for historical 
links, then how can we justify limiting those links by group membership? Clearly Chinese policy 
documents and philosophical texts were very much a part of the discourse of the radical 
Enlightenment, and this is a historical connection.  
 I agree that we should attend to the particular historical moment, as China and England strives 
to do, but we cannot impose upon that moment some essentialist concept of history as western or 
non-western. Sometimes historical conditions might differ in most respects yet could still support 
similar insights if only a few shared conditions obtain. The key features of feudalism identified in Liu 
Zongyuan’s theory of feudalism, noted above, match Marc Bloch’s key features, five out of six. How 
should we explain this if an idea generated at some moment in European history must remain 
unique to that moment, or perhaps unique to western people? The reason for the convergence is 
simply that feudal-like systems are widespread in history and intelligent people can analyze its 
characteristic features. It is this that makes cultural exchange possible. By the seventheenth century 
neither Chinese nor English societies could be construed as culturally pure in any sense. By that time 
China was absorbing all kinds of novel ideas from European sources. I have never known a scholar 
of western culture who would deny that. Well, the reverse was true as well.  
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More challenging is the objection to the following passage in the conclusion: 
 
the protection of human rights globally remains handicapped by the group-based idea that 
institutions better calculated to protect individuals from tyranny are the unique expression of 
a Western Spirit of Freedom [. . .] (Powers, quoted in Flynn 2020: 199). 
 
Professor Flynn observed that “to say that western cultural essentialism is currently generating 
‘insurmountable internal contradictions’ for human rights activists around the world strikes me as an 
overstatement” (Flynn 2020: 199). I welcome the opportunity to unpack the issue in question, which 
was too tersely expressed in the conclusion. The conclusion in fact echoed the book’s introduction, 
where this issue had been raised in connection with the Huntington hypothesis. As is well known, 
Huntington predicted world conflict due to fundamental and enduring value differences between 
different civilizations, the west and the rest.  
 Now let us assume that Huntington was correct and that the pursuit of legal equality (it is 
never truly achieved) is unique to the west. A core insight informing equality is the understanding 
that race, religion, class, national origin—group membership—should not count in matters of law or 
in appointment for careers, public office, and so on. The book shows that this kind of 
understanding was articulated and legislated in China long before the European Enlightenment, but 
let us suppose that no such ideas had developed anywhere before they appeared in Europe. In that 
case, how should enlightened Europeans—who focus on individuals rather than groups, and who 
understand that group membership is irrelevant to human value—how should those people declare 
that this discovery was itself a product of Europeanness? This strikes me as a contradiction.  
 But Professor Flynn objected further to this passage: 
 
If the notion of human rights originally was the outcome of a particular moment in western 
history, then now it can be dismissed as a noble but dated expression of western genius, like 
Michelangelo’s drawing method, admirable yet impractical in today’s world (Powers, quoted 
in Flynn 2020: 199). 
 
He felt that this view “seems to give far too much credence to the assumption that the context for 
the origins of an idea could constrain its contemporary validity or legitimacy” (Flynn 2020: 200). Of 
course, I would agree that insights from the past can be applied to the present, so I can see where he 
is coming from. More background information is in order. 
 I came to realize the utility of the western exceptionalist argument for critics of liberal values 
while reading an article on the ACLU website by Jay Stanley, Senior Policy Analyst, ACLU Speech, 
Privacy, and Technology Project. The article was entitled “Is Privacy a Modern Phenomena?” 
(Stanley 2013).12 Many might respond to that question with “yes, and so what?” But Jay Stanley was 
troubled by the claim, because in his day-to-day defense of the right to privacy, he had encountered 
corporate leaders and others who used this idea to support high-tech invasions of privacy. The 
claim, apparently, was that privacy was unknown in history before modern times, as well as outside 
the west. Now, centuries after the Enlightenment, the notion has become obsolete in a world of 
high-tech. In the end, Jay Stanley felt it necessary to fight that assumption and claim that some 
senses of privacy are not unique to the modern (i.e., western) world.  
 Why? It appears to be because, if someone could show that a concern for privacy, or any 
other “liberal” value, originated uniquely at one moment in western history, they could then claim 
that now conditions have changed, and there is no longer any need for that right. Professor Flynn 
no doubt would observe that this isn’t necessarily so, as a social practice could be useful today 
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irrespective of its origins, but Jay Stanley—who is in the trenches on this issue day to day—felt that 
such arguments were not sufficiently convincing, and that he needed to argue for a more general 
right to privacy, one not limited to the modern world. If we accept his concerns as the product of 
long experience, then we must admit that Mr. Stanley could have built a stronger argument by 
showing that intellectuals and statesmen in China, or elsewhere, both argued and legislated for rights 
to privacy, thus undermining the corporate argument. If this is the case for privacy, I assume that 
similar concerns apply to other “liberal” values as well. That is what prompted that remark in the 
conclusion.  
 These last two objections strike me as both reasonable and interesting, but this last one came 
as a surprise: 
 
A fourth and final point I want to make about this [Michelangelo] passage, in terms of what 
it might say about the stakes of Powers’ project, is that it runs the risk of making the validity 
of certain ideas depend on the ability to say, “See, China had these ideas too” (Flynn 2020: 
200). 
 
I have heard this argument many times in my 40 years in academics. It seems to presume a 
fundamental east/west dichotomy, despite the fact that evidence for serious mixing of ideas during 
the Enlightenment is very strong, not just from my book but from a long list of works by Timothy 
Brook, Jonathan Israel, David Porter, Eugenia Ziroski, and many more. Nonetheless, let’s assume 
that, between the lines, this is a reductio that goes something like this: “If the rhetorical force of the 
Huntington thesis (for instance) derives from the claim that only in the west do we find ideals like 
equality and social justice, and one points to China’s role in the English Enlightenment to 
undermine that thesis, then are we not obliged to find some non-European counterpart for every 
enlightened idea ever entertained by a European?”  
 My reply would be, of course not. We are not engaged in civilizational competition; we are 
talking about a particular set of values that happen to have a very mixed cultural lineage. If legal 
equality, checks, or freedom of religion truly were unique to the west, then the Huntington 
hypothesis and its vision of world conflict would be more compelling. Fortunately, those particular 
values are not unique, and so we should move forward from there.  
 When I have encountered this argument in the past, it sometimes came packaged with more 
disturbing implications that I believe Professor Flynn would reject. Sometimes this argument would 
be deployed to imply that, even if China developed formal checks or print culture first, for instance, 
the western examples still have priority. It would not be, “and the west did it too (much later)”; for 
China we can only say, “they did it too, but ‘ours’ was the real one.” What such arguments suggested 
to me was that a social practice or institution would lack historical interest unless and until a western 
person does it. A history of justice that limits itself to Europe and America, then, would be more 
than sufficient, for nothing significant could be learned from the history of justice struggle outside 
the west. In short, “Not western; doesn’t count.”  
 Such objections call to mind the civilizational comparison framework that Blaut examined. 
As with Professor Field, I do not find those assumptions in articles that Professor Flynn published 
in his own field, so I would like to move away from that to bigger issues that he addressed in one of 
his articles on Habermas and human rights. In that essay he made a distinction that I believe is 
helpful in making sense of the category of “individual” as it applies to human rights, both east and 
west. The passage is long but rich in ideas: 
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Insistence on the juridification of human rights [...] provokes Asian criticism that human 
rights lead persons to view themselves as Westerners: atomized, autonomous, secular and 
self-interested individuals ready to insist on their rights no matter what the cost may be to 
others or to the society at large. The problem with such claims is that they often conflate the 
individualism within the concept of human rights with the individualism of particular ideals 
attributed to Western culture, such as sufficiency or self-interest [...]. Individuals can exercise 
their rights to speak, organize, and participate in government in order to cooperate in 
bringing about changes in their common life. Or they can choose to individually defend their 
rights against all, in an individualistic spirit of antagonism, with only self-interest in mind. 
There are aspects of the legal culture of the United States in particular that both non-
Western and Western critics object to, but they are not necessarily inherent in the very idea 
of an egalitarian rule of law (Flynn 2003: 450).13  
 
This is refreshingly different from orthodox appeals to so-called Asian values, yet the distinction 
Flynn makes is crucial for that debate. Following upon his insights, we may ask if it is helpful, 
heuristically speaking, to conflate self-interest with individualism? The freedom that is asserted by 
the wealthy in this country reminds me of the pre-Enlightenment notion of liberty as privilege. They 
simply equivocate on the fact that “liberty,” in French and English history, had two meanings. 
Originally it meant exclusively inherited privilege linked to wealth and lineage. Later, it came to mean 
liberties held in common by all citizens. That latter meaning requires that the weight of group 
membership be reduced, and so in legal affairs and in the selection of representatives Jefferson 
emphasized individual talent and virtue, along with the facts of the case, as opposed to “wealth and 
parentage.” In this way the American system undermined—but did not eliminate—the social and 
political privileges of the wealthy. Consistent with this view, Flynn’s insights show that one can 
develop a notion of the individual without embracing a more selfish notion of liberty.  
 The view of the individual espoused in the book is consistent with this. As I see it, whenever 
the political and legal system significantly reduces group membership as the determining factor in 
appointment or punishment, the “group” disaggregates from the perspective of the state, yielding 
individuals. When group membership ceases to be the normative determinant for a large swath of 
society, then previously non-privileged individuals may begin to assert themselves in the arts, in 
government, and in the law. The book shows how this came about both in Song China and in 
eighteenth-century England.  
 
 
5 Professor Macedo 
 
Professor Macedo was correct to note that, while the book’s first task was to examine parallels 
between preindustrial China and England, the crisis of Democracy was ever-present between the 
lines. Following his lead, I would like to spend most of the space given me to discuss his comments 
on virtue politics and possible adaptations to the apparent breakdown of democratic institutions. 
However, Macedo also raised some specific questions, which I feel obliged to address.  
 
Responses to Specific Queries 
 
Towards the end of his comments, Professor Macedo raised several questions, such as how well did 
these policies work in practice, did farmers really have the right to approach Grievance Officers, and 
so on? It is good that he did, because many historians might well ask these questions, and it would 
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make sense to include more information on that score in future publications, for the evidence 
presented in the book is far from exhaustive. Originally, I submitted more than 130,000 words to 
Routledge. They asked me to cut it down to 90,000, which I did, but that means there are another 
40,000 words packed with more evidence. This evidence, along with much more to be found in 
books by Peter Bol, John Chaffee, Sukhee Lee, Brian McKnight, and others, would reveal that the 
checks installed to protect ordinary taxpayers were more complex and extensive than my book 
indicates. Likewise, the privacy law discussed in chapter 7 is not the only one of its kind. What has 
been presented in the book, however, should be sufficient to cast doubt on traditional stereotypes 
about all-powerful despotic emperors and mindlessly-groveling oriental subjects.  
 Professor Macedo noticed one passage that was worded too ambiguously, namely, the 
“whopper” regarding religion and legal equality. I’m guessing that this was read as a dismissal of all 
religious activity. The full passage reads as follows: 
 
the lesson to be learned here is that any attempt to establish genuine legal equality requires 
the elimination of religious considerations by structural necessity. As soon as one religion is 
granted authority within the state, group status automatically becomes a factor in the 
disposition of both power and punishment. When that happens, what you have is not 
equality but rather an “inequality-generating system” (56-7, emphasis added).  
 
I intended this as another way of articulating the need for separation of church and state. The 
passage doesn’t say that religion should be eliminated from people’s lives, simply that if any religion 
were given special status in state policy, it would become difficult to maintain legal equality. Legal 
equality means that inherited group membership is prevented as much as possible from influencing 
judicial decisions. Giving a particular denomination special status in the courts therefore would be a 
violation of the separation of church and state. 
 
Virtue Politics 
 
On page 39 ff the book recognized that terms like “virtue” can serve as a rubric for “merit,” 
especially in the early stages of meritocratic thought. An early example can be found in Xunzi, who 
sometimes uses virtue/de in a meritocratic sense, though he also understood authority as majesty. In 
that section it was noted that early modern Europeans sometimes did something similar in using 
terms like “virtue,” and Hankins’ book, though not yet published at the time I wrote, was cited in 
the notes. Such material was used to show that meritocratic ideas can occur in multiple cultural 
traditions, and even in solidly aristocratic social systems. 
 However, the book goes on to distinguish all these attempts from more mature meritocratic 
systems such as one finds in Han or Song China. The distinguishing feature is the concept of 
authority. In a mature meritocracy, the authority is in the office. In aristocracies, it is in the person. 
Aristocracies attempting to introduce meritocratic principles sometimes conceived “a new nobility,” 
made up of the more “virtuous” members of the aristocracy. It is worth noting that in the periods 
Hankins discusses, Europeans were aware of China’s meritocratic standards, as Lovejoy observed 
(Lovejoy 1948, 103-4),14 and at times they attempted to map what they understood of it onto 
Europe’s aristocratic society by using “nobility” as a translation for the idea represented in Chinese 
as zhi. The book chose Baron Pufendorf as a classic example.  
 Pufendorf had read and cited Nieuhof’s work, and learned from the latter that even a person 
of low status in China could earn official “Dignity” (rank) if he were sufficiently learned. From this 
he concluded that “Nobility ought not to depend only upon the Blood, but should much rather be 
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rais’d and establish’d upon Virtue” (127-8). What this means is that political authority most certainly 
did depend upon blood, but the king should also consider “virtue,” meaning merit. China and 
England then cited Hamish Scott, an authority on early modern aristocracy, to show that such 
“merit” consisted mainly of service that would please the king, thereby allowing some members of 
the aristocracy to outrank their peers. This is a far cry from meritocracy, but the notion of “virtue” 
became more meritocratic over time. Chapter 8 traces that idea in detail across two centuries, 
showing how it eventually morphed into a more mature notion of meritocracy in England, with 
Chinese texts being cited or debated all along the way.  
 There is a problem with the Xunzian and early modern European notion of “virtue” as 
merit. It is easy to remove an officer from his office; it is difficult to separate a nobleman from his 
personal authority, especially if conceived as “virtue” rather than administrative performance. The 
early modern European concept of authority, being rooted in the person (though not the individual), 
is highly resistant to institutional constraints, except for the king’s or chancellor’s displeasure. For 
this reason, despite some surface resemblance, I doubt that we can identify such a notion of 
authority with Song or later Neo-Confucians. True, they were concerned with virtue/de, and their 
understanding of that was rooted in classical sources like Mencius, but they were also fully aware of 
the system of bureaucratic checks and the fact that qualification for office was supposed to include 
evidence of dedication to the public good/de expressed as official performance or policy decisions, 
not as Honor. This understanding is clear in the policy documents chosen for translation, including 
some by Zhu Xi.  
 Professor Macedo is correct that I tend to take the narrower meaning of the term for 
virtue/de, as found in policy documents, as the more important one. This meaning should be 
distinguished from the broader semantic range one might find in philosophical texts, especially those 
from the early period. In policy documents de refers more specifically to an active concern for the 
welfare of the people/min. Naturally that requires avoidance of corruption, but principally by 
attending properly to the distinction between public and private interest. That is as much a 
bureaucratic matter as a moral one. On the other hand, the early modern European notion of virtue 
could easily be made to support a privilege system, 1. because authority was still situated in the 
person, and 2. because “virtue” still mapped readily onto “nobility.”  
 I find Professor Macedo’s notion of “soul craft” convincing, and agree that it is not 
incompatible with institutional constraints. His reply to Hankin is nicely balanced: “I agree, 
moreover, that we need urgently to attend to the project of fostering greater moral sensitivity, 
wisdom, competence, public- spiritedness, and civic virtue among citizens and elites” (Macedo 2020: 
204). Professor Macedo’s understanding is not far from the view one will find in policy documents 
by solid “Confucians” like Sima Guang or Zhen Dexiu. 
 If we regard Rousseau and Jefferson as part of the liberal tradition, then it is certainly the 
case that virtue was considered a necessary qualification for public office (Powers 2019: 138-39). 
Since the open compound “genius and virtue,” where “virtue” refers to concern for the public 
welfare, appears as a translation for caide in the 1730s, and later appears in Rousseau, Jefferson, and 
others with much the same meaning, it would seem that the Founding Fathers presumed that 
candidates for office were supposed to have both ability and a concern for the public welfare prior 
to being candidates for election.  
 I am grateful to learn of Professor El Amine’s work and regret that I was unaware of it while 
writing the book. Her contention that “the universal acceptance of the state form creates a globally-
shared institutional condition” would acquire still greater force if we acknowledge that the 
“conceptual apparatus centered on ideals like constitutionalism, rights, and democracy” in fact 
enjoys a mixed lineage, complex not only in its cultural origins, but also in that the debates over our 
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standard set of rights often were inspired by encounters with non-European political thought. These 
debates gave rise to new ideas, sometimes defensive, sometimes deceptive, and sometimes crucial 
for what we now call liberal values.  
 
Mining History for Novel Conceptual Resources 
 
Professor Macedo suggested that the “‘modern-pre-modern’ distinction is not quite right” (Macedo 
2020: 205). This understanding opens up multiple possibilities for reconsidering current policy, both 
in China and in the U.S. I can think of any number of policies from imperial China that could be 
adapted, in improved form, in the United States or in modern China. Legal suits paid for by the 
state, as Le Comte observed, would go far to redress inequalities between rich and poor. Currently, 
if a wealthy person or company cheats one of us to the tune of even a few hundred dollars, it isn’t 
worth it to sue, as it would cost more just to walk into a lawyer’s office. Even if thousands of dollars 
are involved, middle class persons cannot afford to take the wealthy to court because they will be 
outspent. It would appear that the American legal system is weighted in favor of the rich. In this 
regard, it could be argued that the premodern institution is more democratic than current practice.  
 As a supplement to elections, there is much to be said for the examination system, if it could 
be improved to test not only level of education, but expertise (as was sometimes the case in Song 
times) and also dedication to the public good. An anonymous examination system could bring to 
light new talent rather quickly, and would provide a more level playing field for women and 
minorities. This does not require that there should be no elections. If electoral candidates for certain 
positions were chosen from among those who had proven their worth in exams and in office (say, in 
the State Department), the odds of getting an incompetent person elected would be small. Of 
course, much thought would have to be given to how elections could be instituted so as to best 
serve the interests of the people, and how they could supplement career officials as a check on 
official abuse.  
 Speaking of which, our current crisis of the separation of powers exposes the fact that 
elected representatives are inadequate to remove officers who violate the terms of their office, even 
when those violations endanger national security. From the events of the past year, it would appear 
that career bureaucrats, on the whole, are more reliable than elected representatives. This is because 
they are professionally trained experts in their fields, because they have been promoted because they 
followed procedure (including the separation of public and private interest), and because the 
language of professional discourse is fact-based, while the language of politics too often favors 
duplicity. Giving career professionals a substantive role in impeachment, and making them 
independent of representatives who need lots of cash to get elected, might be worth considering.  
 On the China side, Professor Macedo referred to the view that “a meritocratic political 
system that includes one-party authoritarianism [is] superior to multi-party competition when it 
comes to fostering competent and forward-looking political rule oriented to the long-term good of 
the community” (Macedo 2020: 202). Like Professor Macedo, I am also skeptical of the 
authoritarian part of that argument. In many areas that benefit citizens, China has pursued more 
rational policies over the past decade than those we find at home. Millions of people have been 
raised from poverty and into the middle class, and China is pursuing a more rational approach to the 
global climate crisis. We are sometimes told that China can do this because its government is 
authoritarian and doesn’t have to pay mind to the concerns of “the people.” This may be misleading.  
 True, China’s government is more meritocratic, and therefore more reality-based than some 
western nations today, and indeed there is a long history of such administration in China. But I see 
no reason to believe that the Soviet-inspired authoritarian component in modern China is required 
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for adopting rational policies. Meritocracy privileges expertise, which acts as a reality check on 
arbitrary government. For this reason, expertise tends to get suppressed by authoritarian 
governments, whether Maoist, Stalinist, or Fascist. If China continues to take expertise seriously, it 
might discover that it needs to expand channels for public discussion. As for America, polls show 
that most Americans are in favor of action on climate crisis, as well as greater economic equality, 
greater investment in infrastructure, less military spending, and other liberal policies. If America 
were a democracy, then Congressional policy surely would correspond to the results of such polls. 
This was the norm in the past, but now there is little correspondence between policy and what 
Americans want (Gilens and Page 2014).15 
 I also agree with Professor Macedo’s view that, in order for institutional constraints to work, 
the moral values underlying them have to be deeply rooted in the culture through formal and 
informal education that employs both verbal and visual resources. In our own time, thanks to the 
corporate press, it seems likely that notions such as “trickle-down economics” and “survival of the 
fittest” have entered deeply into popular consciousness. The idea of inherited authority—as in only 
“Isildur’s heir” can save the day—also is deeply impressed upon the public mind. I rather doubt that 
one-quarter of the population understands the distinction between officer and office that Paine and 
Jefferson took for granted.  
 Another principle of imperial government that seems relevant to our current condition is the 
idea that political authority resides in the office, not the officer. The officer’s actions are authorized 
only if power is exercised according to proper procedures and in the public interest. In the U.S., the 
press often promotes a different notion of authority more similar to the early modern European 
concept, one situated in the person. And so, although we lack a hereditary aristocracy, we have 
instead an elected nobility. Those who are elected are thought to have received authority directly 
from the people to act with wide discretion over a certain territory (Chicago, Montana, the United 
States). Once elected, these modern noblemen cannot be removed except by the electoral process, 
because the authority is in the person, not in the office.  
 During the impeachment hearings, the contrast between these two notions of authority came 
to light. One side argued that the president, having been elected, could pretty much do whatever he 
thought best. The other side observed that he had been elected to serve the people by fulfilling the 
duties and regulations of the office and must be held to that charge. The latter notion of authority is 
the one I recall from elections held while I was young, but now that understanding is no longer the 
default. That latter concept of authority is also the one we find in many Chinese legal documents 
from Song times onward. Towards the end of the Northern Song, Southern Song, and Ming 
periods, those legal concepts that had served to strengthen the Chinese state, such as the separation 
of court and state, officer and office, or the importance of expertise, gradually declined, leading to 
the decline of empire. Contemporary parallels come to mind. 
 Like European history, with its rich body of reflection upon governance, China’s history 
could provide “novel conceptual resources” (to borrow from Professor Field) for modern China or 
for western nations. China already has adapted some European institutions, such as local elections. 
Some remnants of imperial institutions can be found as well—such as a version of the Department 
of Investigation. But it is not obvious that the modern versions are always better than the historical 
ones. It is also not obvious that elections are somehow incompatible with the more progressive 
imperial policies, seeing as imperial China recognized the need for popular input and established 
viable channels for its expression. In short, there is much room for further discussion all around.  
 My sincere thanks to all four discussants. I have learned a great deal from them all, and have 
enjoyed ruminating on their thoughtful reflections.  
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